Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 6
The RAF in Counter-<strong>Insurgency</strong> Warfare:
British Intervention in Greece, 1944-45
Christina J M Goulter
In <strong>the</strong> autumn of 1944, British forces became involved in what was ostensibly a peace
enforcement <strong>and</strong> stabilisation operation in Greece, only to find <strong>the</strong>mselves in <strong>the</strong>
midst of a full-blown Communist insurgency. Communist forces had secured most
of <strong>the</strong> Greek countryside, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir attention was now focused on <strong>the</strong> urban centres,
especially A<strong>the</strong>ns, in a bid to take power. The fledgling Greek government, which had just
returned from exile after <strong>the</strong> withdrawal of German forces, had no hope of reconstituting
armed forces to meet <strong>the</strong> Communist challenge, <strong>and</strong> a request was made to <strong>the</strong> British
government for assistance. At <strong>the</strong> time, only a small l<strong>and</strong> force could be spared from <strong>the</strong>
Italian campaign, <strong>and</strong> it became apparent very quickly that this was not sufficient. The
British l<strong>and</strong> force, amounting to two brigades, was surrounded in <strong>the</strong> centre of A<strong>the</strong>ns,
<strong>and</strong> air power was called upon first to interdict Communist lines of communication <strong>and</strong>
to reinforce <strong>and</strong> re-supply <strong>the</strong> besieged troops, <strong>and</strong> later to provide close air support.
In today’s parlance, <strong>the</strong> Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force proved to be remarkably “agile, adaptable <strong>and</strong>
capable”. It was highly responsive, extremely flexible, <strong>and</strong> did its job with minimal
collateral damage, in what was a complex <strong>and</strong> ambiguous urban environment. British
forces generally had a very steep learning curve throughout <strong>the</strong> campaign, but, in <strong>the</strong> end,
<strong>the</strong>y achieved a textbook piece of joint counter-insurgency warfare in which air power
proved to be <strong>the</strong> key enabler.
The origins of British involvement in what is generally considered to be <strong>the</strong> “second round”
of <strong>the</strong> Greek Civil War are a very complex subject. 202 However, a brief outline of <strong>the</strong> main
features of <strong>the</strong> period between 1941 <strong>and</strong> 1944 is required in order to underst<strong>and</strong> how
<strong>the</strong> Communists gained such a stranglehold over Greece <strong>and</strong> came so close to victory,
<strong>and</strong> why Britain became involved. After <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> disastrous Greek campaign of
1941, Britain maintained a presence in Greece, in <strong>the</strong> form of SIS <strong>and</strong> SOE operatives.
Greece was important to British gr<strong>and</strong> strategy <strong>and</strong> foreign policy for a number of reasons.
The immediate wartime imperative was to keep German forces tied down in <strong>the</strong> eastern
Mediterranean to prevent reinforcement of North Africa. There was also a longer-term
concern over Soviet domination of <strong>the</strong> Balkans <strong>and</strong> Greece, so keeping a covert presence
in <strong>the</strong> area was an important insurance policy.
By <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> first SOE missions in late 1941, a number of different resistance
movements were already in existence, but two movements dominated <strong>the</strong> picture: one
Republican, called EDES 203 , <strong>and</strong> one Communist, called ELAS 204 . With hindsight, one
of <strong>the</strong> biggest mistakes made by SOE, both in Greece <strong>and</strong> elsewhere, was to support
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 99