Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Neglected Contributors: The Continental European <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>s
multiple tasks in on one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same sortie .655 All Dutch F-16 pilots are trained in both
<strong>the</strong> air-to-air <strong>and</strong> air-to-ground role. 656 Due to this concept <strong>and</strong> its inherent flexibility,
<strong>the</strong> Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force detachment was <strong>the</strong> only unit capable of carrying out all
three missions in <strong>the</strong> course of Operation Deny Flight. The fact that Dutch F-16s could be
re-tasked while executing a mission gave <strong>the</strong> combined air operations centre at Vicenza
some extra leeway. 657 During Operation Deliberate Force, it happened at several occasions
that Dutch F-16s were flying air defence missions with bombs attached to <strong>the</strong>ir underwing
pylons <strong>and</strong> minutes later, <strong>the</strong>y were re-rolled for an air-to-ground mission. 658 Since
swing-role not only requires multi-role capable combat aircraft but also versatile aircrews,
<strong>the</strong> Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force is willing to meet <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s of a very intensive <strong>and</strong>
costly yearly training programme. From a Dutch point of view, <strong>the</strong>re is no doubt that this
approach pays off. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force has retained its capability of
operating at low-level altitudes. Although air operations over <strong>the</strong> Balkans were executed
at medium-altitude, <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Staff argued in <strong>the</strong> wake of Operation Allied Force
that this would not mean that low-level missions were no longer part of <strong>the</strong> equation, as
situations might arise in <strong>the</strong> future, requiring such a capability .659
Not only with regard to <strong>the</strong> swing-role concept did Dutch aircrew put a premium upon
flexibility, but also with regard to force packaging. When it was announced in November
1994 that all missions had to be escorted by SEAD aircraft, some allies, including Dutch
pilots, expressed doubts about this far-from-flexible way of operating. 660 Instead of overreliance
upon SEAD <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>-off jamming assets, Dutch pilots preferred to make <strong>the</strong>ir
flight patterns as unpredictable as possible .661
Despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> air operations over Bosnia represented <strong>the</strong> first real operations for
Dutch fighter pilots, some aircrews served as leaders of large multi-national formations
which were to perform difficult missions. According to Lieutenant General M<strong>and</strong>erfeld,
Comm<strong>and</strong>er in Chief from 1992 to 1995, factors for this outst<strong>and</strong>ing performance were
sound training <strong>and</strong> education. 662
For Operation Allied Force in 1999, a total of twenty Dutch F-16s <strong>and</strong> two KDC-
10 tanker aircraft were made available to NATO. Transport aircraft were flying almost
around-<strong>the</strong>-clock carrying <strong>the</strong> right type of munitions on schedule to Amendola air base
in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Italy. Through <strong>the</strong>se efforts, a high operational tempo could be achieved
<strong>and</strong> an average degree of readiness of over 95 percent could be sustained. Throughout
Operation Allied Force, Dutch F-16s flew 700 air-to-air, approximately 450 air-to-ground
<strong>and</strong> 50 reconnaissance <strong>and</strong> battle damage assessment sorties over <strong>the</strong> Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. The Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force delivered more than 800 air-to-ground
weapons, of which 32 percent were precision guided. Given <strong>the</strong>se figures, <strong>the</strong> Royal
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”