Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Starting with a Blank Sheet: Principles of War for a New Century
My point: Given <strong>the</strong> extreme risk of putting our sons <strong>and</strong> daughters in harm’s way – <strong>the</strong>
political as well as military risk – it should be <strong>the</strong> aim of all joint planners to devise ways
of achieving national objectives with <strong>the</strong> least cost in blood <strong>and</strong> treasure. That means we
should send in large numbers of conventional ground troops as a last resort. Sometimes
that will be necessary; but too many of our current planners, especially in <strong>the</strong> ground
forces, see boots on <strong>the</strong> ground as <strong>the</strong> first resort instead of <strong>the</strong> last. 452
To sum up this first section, I am contending that a totally new environment confronted <strong>the</strong>
US in <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> Soviet collapse in 1989. That new environment was dominated
by countries <strong>and</strong> non-state actors that learned very quickly that taking on <strong>the</strong> US, <strong>and</strong>
<strong>the</strong> west in general, in a conventional war was folly. Asymmetrical warfare, <strong>and</strong> especially
terrorism, was to be <strong>the</strong> weapon of choice against an overwhelmingly powerful US. To
its credit, America <strong>and</strong> its closest allies reacted initially with gratifying quickness <strong>and</strong>
cleverness. Beginning in Desert Storm in 1991 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n followed by military campaigns
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Iraq, we used our asymmetric advantages.
We used a new paradigm of war that employed overwhelming air <strong>and</strong> space power, SOF,
indigenous ground forces, <strong>and</strong> networked intelligence <strong>and</strong> C2 assets. The result was <strong>the</strong>
achievement of political objectives quickly, with a minimal loss of life on both sides.
That successful paradigm, for both political <strong>and</strong> military reasons (most of <strong>the</strong>m bad),
was ignored in Iraq following <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong> Saddam Hussein regime. The result is
increasingly viewed as a disaster. Conventional US <strong>and</strong> British ground forces have taken
<strong>the</strong> lead in attempting to squash <strong>the</strong> ever-growing insurgency in Iraq. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than being
successful in this task, <strong>the</strong>y have at times fuelled <strong>the</strong> insurgency while simultaneously
providing more targets for <strong>the</strong> insurgents. In a poll taken in October 2003, fully twothirds
of Iraqis saw <strong>the</strong> Coalition as “occupying powers,” while only 15 percent saw <strong>the</strong>m
as “liberators.” 453 Four years later, ano<strong>the</strong>r poll had 69 percent of Iraqis saying that <strong>the</strong> US
presence was making things worse; only 21 percent thought <strong>the</strong> Americans were making
things better. 454 Clearly, <strong>the</strong> resort to old methods for this new type of war has failed.
It is now time to posit a new set of Principles of War that reflect <strong>the</strong> new realities discussed
above <strong>and</strong> this new, revolutionary method of war.
The desire to impose order on <strong>the</strong> chaos of war is age-old. This desire manifested itself by
military thinkers, as well as practicing generals, positing various rules, laws, maxims <strong>and</strong>
principles that governed <strong>the</strong> conduct of war. This was an imminently practical endeavour,
<strong>and</strong> still is. The human brain needs to limit complexity, especially in crisis situations when
time is short. It does this by categorizing. For soldiers, sailors <strong>and</strong> airmen this means
reducing <strong>the</strong>ir job to certain basics. Some of <strong>the</strong> devices used have assumed <strong>the</strong> character
186
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”