Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 11
believed, would be as welcomed in Iraq as had Anglo-American <strong>and</strong>
Free French forces in France in 1944. Some argue that <strong>the</strong> prospect
of guerrilla warfare was dismissed because, among o<strong>the</strong>r things,
it raised <strong>the</strong> prospect of a Vietnam-like quagmire. Frank official
discussion of possible intractable post-war political <strong>and</strong> military
challenges in Iraq would have impeded efforts to mobilize public
support for going to war.
In o<strong>the</strong>r words, our military leaders did not plan for trouble, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y deterred <strong>the</strong>mselves
from even seriously considering such an eventuality for fear it would contradict <strong>the</strong> views
of <strong>the</strong>ir civilians leaders. Tom Ricks, in his sobering account of military operations in Iraq
titled Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, relates how <strong>the</strong>se conventional
troops fumbled, disastrously, <strong>the</strong>ir mission. 441
Ricks begins by stating that most military observers on <strong>the</strong> scene advised against <strong>the</strong>
decisions for disarmament <strong>and</strong> de-Baathification, but Bremer overruled <strong>the</strong>m. It appears
that General Ricardo Sanchez (<strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>er in Iraq following Franks), as well as <strong>the</strong>
o<strong>the</strong>r ground comm<strong>and</strong>ers in <strong>the</strong>atre, rolled over far too easily on <strong>the</strong>se decisions despite
<strong>the</strong>ir alleged misgivings. 442 As a consequence, during <strong>the</strong> year following spring 2003 <strong>the</strong>
situation in Iraq deteriorated dramatically.
As an aside, I would note here an interesting aspect regarding civilian control of <strong>the</strong> military
(a bedrock of US <strong>and</strong> UK military tradition). The key mistakes made were by Bremer <strong>and</strong>
his civilian staff. These mistakes were ei<strong>the</strong>r approved or condoned by civilian leaders
in Washington (Bremer worked for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who worked
for President Bush). General Sanchez <strong>and</strong> his military associates, seemingly dutiful <strong>and</strong>
obedient servants, remained quiet as <strong>the</strong>y attempted to carry out orders <strong>the</strong>y later claimed
were dumber than dirt. My point: just because civilians are in control of policy <strong>and</strong> in even
firmer control of <strong>the</strong>ir military subordinates does not mean that <strong>the</strong>ir policy will be ei<strong>the</strong>r
wise or successful. The broader question is, what is a senior officer to do when his civilian
superior gives him orders that he believes to be foolish or wrong? It would seem that
our military simply says “yes sir” <strong>and</strong> does as it is told. Given <strong>the</strong> Iraqi debacle, which so
parallels <strong>the</strong> Vietnam situation in <strong>the</strong> actions/non-actions of senior military officers <strong>the</strong>re,
is that <strong>the</strong> best <strong>and</strong> most responsible course?
Ricks also strongly criticises <strong>the</strong> activities of <strong>the</strong> 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) for its
activities north of Baghdad. The 4th’s comm<strong>and</strong>er encouraged an extremely aggressive
stance when dealing with <strong>the</strong> Iraqi populace. When his troops went into an area, <strong>the</strong>y did
so heavily armed, usually at night, <strong>and</strong> brooked no interference. Ricks quotes observers as
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 183