Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 8
year. At <strong>the</strong> geopolitical level, <strong>the</strong> final stage of <strong>the</strong> conflict coincided with <strong>the</strong> beginning
of <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact <strong>and</strong> Soviet Union.
Conclusions
Soviet air power had shown that it could project itself far beyond its borders in a short
space of time. 344 Moreover, <strong>the</strong> AA had accumulated impressive experience in operating
helicopters in <strong>the</strong> COIN role, along with using close air support platforms against a
fleeting but deadly enemy, nicknamed <strong>the</strong> “ghosts” by <strong>the</strong> Soviet troops. They also learned
lessons about <strong>the</strong> limitations <strong>and</strong> possibilities of operating in a hot <strong>and</strong> high environment.
The Army learned that air power offered an attractive alternative to ground manoeuvre
with a Bronegrupa (a mixed group of tanks <strong>and</strong> armoured personnel carriers) in some
cases, with vehicles being relatively slow on Afghanistan’s moribund road network <strong>and</strong>
unable to operate in some of <strong>the</strong> harsh terrain. Helicopters also gave an obvious speed
<strong>and</strong> firepower advantage, being able to press attacks close to <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen, when
conscripts were often reluctant to close contact with <strong>the</strong> rebels. 345 “The most significant
development in air support for Soviet ground operations in Afghanistan was <strong>the</strong>ir use of
armed helicopters,” noted one US Army report on <strong>the</strong> war. 346
Fighter-bomber <strong>and</strong> bomber units were not, however, deployed with imagination.
The former were seldom used in a “cab-rank” fashion to respond to sudden targets of
opportunity. Instead, <strong>the</strong>y were used in a predictable fashion; softening up objectives
prior to a ground engagement, with <strong>the</strong> close air support task falling to <strong>the</strong> helicopters
instead. The use of bombers to win <strong>the</strong> battle against popular Mujahideen support can be
was an abject failure.
Despite <strong>the</strong> presence of robust Mujahideen air defences, both <strong>the</strong> VVS <strong>and</strong> AA did modify
<strong>the</strong>ir tactics to safeguard <strong>the</strong>ir aircraft <strong>and</strong> added countermeasures, while also actively
interdicting supply routes for such weapons across international borders. 347 However, <strong>the</strong>
Soviet’s inability to secure <strong>the</strong>ir airbases in Afghanistan reduced <strong>the</strong> quantity of aircraft
that <strong>the</strong>y were willing to deploy in <strong>the</strong>atre at facilities which were often bereft of hardened
revetments for protecting aircraft; both reducing <strong>the</strong> quantity of air power available <strong>and</strong>
increased <strong>the</strong> response times for aircraft beginning <strong>the</strong>ir sorties from <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn USSR. 348
Ano<strong>the</strong>r significant failure was in terms of training. Training, where it was available, failed
to both learn lessons from <strong>the</strong> war <strong>and</strong> pass <strong>the</strong>m down to <strong>the</strong> pilots <strong>and</strong> crews earmarked
for <strong>the</strong> Afghan <strong>the</strong>atre. Pilots who did show initiative were not rewarded for <strong>the</strong>ir efforts.
Dr Galeotti notes that “groups of pilots which did show initiative were dispersed across
<strong>the</strong> VVS infrastructure” upon <strong>the</strong>ir return from Afghanistan ra<strong>the</strong>r than being ensconced
in <strong>the</strong> Staff Colleges <strong>and</strong> Academies to disseminate <strong>the</strong>ir wisdom. The military became
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 141