Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 4
Unnecessary or Unsung?
The Strategic Role of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Britain’s Colonial
Counter-Insurgencies
Andrew Mumford <strong>and</strong> Caroline Kennedy-Pipe
Popular convention holds that small wars <strong>and</strong> counter-insurgencies are won or
lost by <strong>the</strong> troops on <strong>the</strong> ground, who utilise an ethos of “minimum force” <strong>and</strong>
apply intelligence to quash insurgent cells whilst winning <strong>the</strong> “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds”
of indigenous populations. It is to <strong>the</strong> infantry that we usually look to underst<strong>and</strong> victory
or defeat. We need only to observe <strong>the</strong> contemporary <strong>and</strong> very lively debates in both
<strong>the</strong> US <strong>and</strong> UK over <strong>the</strong> current <strong>and</strong> apparent failure to see very familiar discussions
about military comm<strong>and</strong>, military deployment <strong>and</strong> political strategies. We have been here
before. Whe<strong>the</strong>r it is <strong>the</strong> US failure in Vietnam or British success in Irel<strong>and</strong>, much has been
written about how to defeat <strong>the</strong> insurgent. British imperial history has yielded its own
valuable lessons throughout <strong>the</strong> Twentieth Century but especially in <strong>the</strong> post-1945 period
when <strong>the</strong> retreat from empire spelled an intense period of military activity. 109
The role of air power in such conflicts has been ra<strong>the</strong>r over-looked in favour of an armybased
focus. We argue that, laudable though that concentration may have been, <strong>the</strong>re is,
especially in <strong>the</strong> light of <strong>the</strong> current wars in Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> Iraq, much to be said for
revisiting colonial campaigns of <strong>the</strong> past <strong>and</strong> looking again at <strong>the</strong> role of air power <strong>and</strong>
its undoubted importance in defeating <strong>the</strong> communist insurgents in Malaya <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mau
Mau in Kenya during <strong>the</strong> 1950s.
We are aware that even as we revisit <strong>the</strong> past, current controversy continues over <strong>the</strong> use
of air power in Iraq <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan. Not least <strong>the</strong>re is a very public perception that air
power is a double-edged instrument. 110 It may provide <strong>the</strong> initial “shock <strong>and</strong> awe” which
might subdue enemy forces but it might also inflict <strong>the</strong> type of civilian casualties which
may irrevocably inflame opinion towards <strong>the</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> insurgents <strong>and</strong> public opinion
against democratic governments. (We also note that <strong>the</strong> media has permanently changed
<strong>the</strong> way some people think of air power since, say, <strong>the</strong> Kosovo conflict when “we” became
used to <strong>the</strong> idea of casualty-free war waged entirely from <strong>the</strong> air without troops 111 ). The
use of air power, <strong>the</strong>refore, as we go on to argue, requires subtlety, sophistication <strong>and</strong>
strategic vision. 112 We are not experts on <strong>the</strong> RAF nor indeed on air power but we hope
that by analysing military <strong>and</strong> government documents held in <strong>the</strong> National Archives we
can look at <strong>the</strong> air lessons learnt by <strong>the</strong> British from <strong>the</strong>se colonial campaigns <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n
extrapolate some lessons.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 67