Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

“Looks Suspicious”: The US Marines <strong>Air</strong> Campaign against <strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>ino Insurgents of Nicaragua 1927-1933
guaranteed a growing support base for S<strong>and</strong>ino. This can be documented through <strong>the</strong>
interviews of <strong>the</strong> surviving S<strong>and</strong>inista soldiers made during <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>and</strong> 1990s. While
<strong>the</strong>se were taken decades after <strong>the</strong> war ended, many still had very vivid memories of
<strong>the</strong> period. A number specifically remembered <strong>the</strong> aerial attacks. For example, Eulogio
Espinales López described how his family home had been bombed <strong>and</strong> his fleeing family
shot at. He noted: “This <strong>the</strong>n was <strong>the</strong> motive why people joined <strong>the</strong> army. They didn’t
want to die defenseless.” 192 In ano<strong>the</strong>r example, Ascensión Iglesias Rivera also described
how <strong>the</strong> houses had been bombed <strong>and</strong> even <strong>the</strong>ir animals killed. He added that <strong>the</strong>refore
<strong>the</strong>y had to fight <strong>the</strong> foreigners, <strong>the</strong> “gringo invaders,” to defend <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>ir “fa<strong>the</strong>rs
had left <strong>the</strong>m”. 193
This concept is key to underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>the</strong> growth of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>inista resistance. When <strong>the</strong>
war started S<strong>and</strong>ino had few followers. Initially his nationalist rhetoric made little sense to
<strong>the</strong> illiterate, isolated Segovian peasants. Many had moved into <strong>the</strong> mountains to escape
<strong>the</strong> reach of <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan state. Many felt that <strong>the</strong>y should not <strong>the</strong>y risk <strong>the</strong>ir lives for
a country of which <strong>the</strong>y barely felt part. However, by chasing S<strong>and</strong>ino into <strong>the</strong> mountains
<strong>the</strong> ensuing Marine actions alienated <strong>the</strong> local population. S<strong>and</strong>ino now gave voice to
<strong>the</strong>ir growing frustrations <strong>and</strong> grievances. Many Segovian peasants asked why <strong>the</strong>se
foreigners were committing what <strong>the</strong>y perceived to be atrocities against <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>the</strong>ir
families <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir livelihoods. Thus, <strong>the</strong>y joined to get revenge <strong>and</strong> protect <strong>the</strong>mselves
from what <strong>the</strong>y felt were invaders. They became nationalist soldiers not because of
S<strong>and</strong>ino but because of <strong>the</strong> Marines. 194
Conclusions
The US did not win <strong>the</strong> war against S<strong>and</strong>ino. It ended in a stalemate. 195 S<strong>and</strong>ino’s success
was not military, but political. While <strong>the</strong> Marines won almost every battle, <strong>the</strong>y lost <strong>the</strong>
“hearts <strong>and</strong> minds” of <strong>the</strong> local population. The Marines also had political problems within
<strong>the</strong> US where <strong>the</strong> long war was very controversial. By 1932, in <strong>the</strong> midst of <strong>the</strong> Great
Depression, Washington announced that <strong>the</strong> last of <strong>the</strong> Marines would be withdrawn
from Nicaragua by <strong>the</strong> end of that year. In February 1933, S<strong>and</strong>ino signed a ceasefire
agreement with <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan government <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n disb<strong>and</strong>ed his army. The war
ended with <strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>inistas undefeated on <strong>the</strong> battlefield <strong>and</strong> in almost total political <strong>and</strong>
military control of <strong>the</strong> rural Segovias. Many Nicaraguans throughout <strong>the</strong> country now saw
S<strong>and</strong>ino as a nationalist hero. 196
Marine strategists had clearly seen <strong>the</strong> need to win popular support within Nicaragua.
Restraint to protect civilians was emphasised over <strong>and</strong> over <strong>and</strong> became an important
component of <strong>the</strong> Marines’ small war doctrine as it was being developed. The Marine
Small Wars Manual, based mainly on <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan campaign, underscored that “<strong>the</strong>
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”