Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 4
do with increased aerial inaccuracy or deliberate targeting of civilians. However, as our
case studies have highlighted, air power has always been treated in counter-insurgency
conflicts as potentially politically controversial. <strong>Air</strong> power may be used today with more
willingness by <strong>the</strong> military’s political masters. However, <strong>the</strong> consequences of its direct use
rises concomitantly. What <strong>the</strong> historical case studies, <strong>and</strong> an analysis of <strong>the</strong> applicability
of air power in <strong>the</strong> current War on Terror, serves to demonstrate is that <strong>the</strong> political belief
that air power possesses a “magic touch,” as it were, in counter-insurgency scenarios has
not changed. Yet what Malaya <strong>and</strong> Kenya serve to highlight is that not only is it in <strong>the</strong>
indirect capacity that air power serves its most effective function in such conflict, but that
offensive aerial bombardment against insurgent units is ei<strong>the</strong>r futile or detrimental. Such
lessons are worth remembering if <strong>the</strong> War on Terror is to win not only military battles, but
also <strong>the</strong> battle for “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds”.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 79