Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 7
Despite <strong>the</strong>se obstacles, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> missions continued. However, while it did
tremendous damage to <strong>the</strong> jungles <strong>and</strong> forests of South Vietnam, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> did not
achieve <strong>the</strong> two primary goals <strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration had identified. The defoliation,
while extensive, did not have <strong>the</strong> anticipated effect on <strong>the</strong> NLF. Troops continued to come
into South Vietnam from North Vietnam <strong>and</strong>, once <strong>the</strong>re, <strong>the</strong>ir ability to strike at South
Vietnamese forces remained. 258 Many attacks occurred at night; it is not clear how much a
lack of cover hampered <strong>the</strong> NLF under those circumstances. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, one Australian
military observer in Saigon suggested that defoliation of areas along roads actually helped
<strong>the</strong> insurgents. If a swath of vegetation were removed, any guerrillas in <strong>the</strong> surroundings
would have a clear field of fire to <strong>the</strong> road. 259
Ranch H<strong>and</strong> was also ineffective at denying <strong>the</strong> NLF <strong>the</strong> food required to carry on
<strong>the</strong>ir operations in <strong>the</strong> South. This goal was likely unrealistic. The primary reason is
that historically military forces have had first call on whatever food was available to a
population. “Soldiers can generally forage for <strong>the</strong>mselves at <strong>the</strong> expense of <strong>the</strong> civilian
population.” 260
Even before Ranch H<strong>and</strong> began, it was apparent that <strong>the</strong> civilian
population might counteract <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of any food interdiction in South Vietnam.
In July 1961, Rostow pointed to “<strong>the</strong> continued insecurity of <strong>the</strong> population <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
unwillingness to take <strong>the</strong> risks of denying food <strong>and</strong> intelligence to <strong>the</strong> Viet Cong, <strong>and</strong> of
supplying it to <strong>the</strong> Viet-Nam cities <strong>and</strong> Diem’s government, respectively.” 261 Some South
Vietnamese were actively against <strong>the</strong>ir government <strong>and</strong> may well have willingly supplied
<strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn forces.
Since Ranch H<strong>and</strong> nei<strong>the</strong>r appreciably slowed <strong>the</strong> influx of NLF troops nor sufficiently
reduced <strong>the</strong> NLF food supply, it is unlikely that, in <strong>the</strong> long run, <strong>the</strong> operation saved
<strong>the</strong> US a significant amount of money or manpower. However, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> was very
effective at generating antipathy toward <strong>the</strong> US from <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese <strong>the</strong>mselves,
from US citizens, <strong>and</strong> from o<strong>the</strong>r countries. The administration, to its credit, recognised
<strong>the</strong> potential for this. From <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong> operation, <strong>the</strong> administration anticipated an
outcry. “It is already clear,” wrote Gilpatric in November 1961,
that any such program will be subject to charges of chemical/
biological warfare. [United States Ambassador to Vietnam Frederick]
Nolting reported on November 6 that Radio Hanoi announced
that <strong>the</strong> GVN has used ‘poison gas’ on <strong>the</strong> rice crop in <strong>the</strong> Tay Ninh
vicinity <strong>and</strong> that people had been made ill. 262
Debate occurred within <strong>the</strong> administration over <strong>the</strong> potential magnitude of this problem.
Roger Hilsman, who served as Director of <strong>the</strong> State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 121