Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 13
ground, often termed “targets of opportunity”. Compared to pre-planned missions, it is
not possible to exercise <strong>the</strong> same depth of judgment on <strong>the</strong> risks of collateral damage
<strong>and</strong> civilian casualties. Both <strong>the</strong> pilots <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> personnel on <strong>the</strong> ground make <strong>the</strong>ir own
assessments, but naturally not as thoroughly as in pre-planned missions. In order to
consider <strong>the</strong> target’s legitimacy, time can be one of <strong>the</strong> aspects that influences <strong>the</strong> ethical
assessment when attacking a target of opportunity. Even if a target is authorised by a
higher comm<strong>and</strong> echelon <strong>and</strong> is in conformity with relevant rules of engagement (ROE)
<strong>the</strong> time factor is of importance. 538 But time alone cannot account for <strong>the</strong> risk of making
wrong ethical judgments. Within this limited span, decisions with both operational
<strong>and</strong> ethical implications have to been taken fairly quickly. The judgment of pilots <strong>and</strong>
personnel on <strong>the</strong> ground is fur<strong>the</strong>r influenced by <strong>the</strong> “heat of <strong>the</strong> battle” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> time
pressure imposed by <strong>the</strong> desire to conduct <strong>the</strong> bombing. As Thomas Wards puts it: “How
for example, can a belligerent know whe<strong>the</strong>r a bombing mission promises sufficiently
significant military gains to justify <strong>the</strong> risk of civilian casualties if both <strong>the</strong> risk of casualties
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> prospective gains are matters of conjecture?”. 539 The question is: does <strong>the</strong> pilot or
<strong>the</strong> personnel on <strong>the</strong> ground have a complete picture of <strong>the</strong> situation, so that he or she
can decide if <strong>the</strong> risk of collateral damage, for example, is proportionate to <strong>the</strong> possible
benefit? Constraints from <strong>the</strong> environment can add to <strong>the</strong> difficulty of forming sound
judgments. Yet making an ethically correct judgement is up to <strong>the</strong> individuals concerned.
Ethics must be one of <strong>the</strong> crucial assessments when bombs are to be dropped.
Ordnance
When engaging a target of opportunity, <strong>the</strong> aircraft has only its loaded ordnance. There is
little flexibility concerning what kind of ordnance to use once <strong>the</strong> aircraft is airborne. Thus,
air power can be less flexible when it comes to delivering relevant ordnance which can
be adjusted to changes in <strong>the</strong> tactical situation. The ordnance selected for a pre-planned
mission is specially picked out for <strong>the</strong> designated target <strong>and</strong> can <strong>the</strong>refore be subject to
an assessment of proportionality. This can not be done to <strong>the</strong> same degree when targets
of opportunity are to be attacked. It seems that air power fights with ordnance designed
for conventional war. The tool one already has decides what one does. 540 In today’s battle
environment that ordnance is ill-suited to some of <strong>the</strong> missions conducted. So both <strong>the</strong>
lack of flexibility concerning ordnance once airborne <strong>and</strong> ordnance not adjusted to targets
create ethical challenges. The principle of proportionality emphasises <strong>the</strong> important moral
aspect of minimizing <strong>the</strong> harm inflicted. Is it ethically right to use a 500 pound GBU 541
against two insurgents?
Intelligence
Precision guided munitions can only be as precise as <strong>the</strong> intelligence <strong>the</strong> bombing is
based upon. In <strong>the</strong> words of Phillip Meilinger: “In essence, <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> is targeting, targeting
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 229