Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Unnecessary or Unsung? The Strategic Role of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Britain’s Colonial Counter-Insurgencies
Background
The military <strong>and</strong> political nuances presented by insurgencies after World War II forced
<strong>the</strong> RAF to radically rethink its doctrine of “air control”. It had sought aerial primacy
in containing uprisings after <strong>the</strong> Great War, thus negating <strong>the</strong> need for ground troop
intervention. Imperial policing, especially in <strong>the</strong> new m<strong>and</strong>ates in <strong>the</strong> wake of World
War I, had stretched <strong>the</strong> financial costs of Empire. The comparatively cheap, relatively
successful, yet concertedly controversial suppression of uprisings in Somalial<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Iraq
in <strong>the</strong> early 1920s set a precedent for <strong>the</strong> effective <strong>and</strong> prevalent use of air power in a
counter-insurgency strategy. 113 <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> had proved its worth in low-intensity conflict.
However, <strong>the</strong> experiences of World War II were inevitably to dominate strategic thinking
for <strong>the</strong> RAF. Close air support <strong>and</strong> long-range bombing missions were <strong>the</strong> tasks <strong>the</strong> RAF
emerged from <strong>the</strong> war knowing it could achieve with success. Yet <strong>the</strong> RAF had to adapt
to <strong>the</strong> fundamental change in <strong>the</strong> nature of conflict that was to come to <strong>the</strong> fore in <strong>the</strong>
mid-to-late 1940s. Alongside <strong>the</strong> undoubted revolution in control of <strong>the</strong> air brought
about by <strong>the</strong> post-1945 nuclear era, <strong>the</strong>re was still for <strong>the</strong> British <strong>the</strong> challenge of imperial
conflict. Isolated colonial uprisings by identifiable paramilitary tribal, ethnic or religious
groups were transformed, after World War II, into “wars amongst <strong>the</strong> people” in which
<strong>the</strong> “enemy” operated within society <strong>and</strong> where <strong>the</strong> exigencies of winning civilian “hearts
<strong>and</strong> minds” provoked a reappraisal of <strong>the</strong> utilisation of air power. <strong>Air</strong> power could no
longer be used as <strong>the</strong> primary offensive counter-insurgency weapon. Although military
<strong>and</strong> political strategists on both sides of <strong>the</strong> Atlantic remained fixated on planning for
a nuclear exchange with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> need for air power to fulfil a nuclear
weapon delivery role, <strong>the</strong>re was for politicians in London <strong>the</strong> practical need to respond to
Maoist guerrilla warfare.
Initially this rural asymmetric form of conflict shifted <strong>the</strong> operational emphasis away
from <strong>the</strong> RAF <strong>and</strong> back towards <strong>the</strong> Army. Ground troops became essential not only for
providing security to remote communities <strong>and</strong> economic resources (such as tin mines
or rubber plantations) that were vulnerable to insurgent attack, but in engaging elusive
jungle or forest-bound units of guerrillas. The British military were forced to adapt to
<strong>the</strong>se challenges, first during <strong>the</strong> Malayan Emergency (1948-60) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n during <strong>the</strong>
Kenyan Emergency to quell <strong>the</strong> Mau Mau uprising (1952-60).
The two conflicts represented <strong>the</strong> first tests of <strong>the</strong> British military’s adjustment to <strong>the</strong>
changed nature of asymmetric warfare, stretching its ability to conduct operations in aid
of <strong>the</strong> civil power. Political primacy (understood here as <strong>the</strong> subordination of military
comm<strong>and</strong> to a politicised strategy <strong>and</strong> overseen by <strong>the</strong> political community) distinguished
<strong>the</strong> conduct of <strong>the</strong>se campaigns, whilst <strong>the</strong> ethos of “minimum force,” essentially a
commitment to <strong>the</strong> discriminate use of firepower <strong>and</strong> respectful treatment of <strong>the</strong> civilian
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”