Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Insurgency</strong>: Some Preliminary Thoughts - Joel Hayward
authors demonstrate below in this volume, <strong>the</strong>ir contributions are increasingly influential.
Interdiction is also problematic as a means of reducing <strong>the</strong> fighting strength of insurgent
forces because <strong>the</strong>y deliberately minimise <strong>the</strong>ir reliance on western-style logistics
tails. Interdiction tends to work best in a conventional setting with an intense battle
rhythm that involves <strong>the</strong> consumption of vast quantities of materiel. Ideally for <strong>the</strong> air
force undertaking <strong>the</strong> interdiction, <strong>the</strong> battleground would be containable, have no
porous borders <strong>and</strong> have only supply routes that are limited in number, well known
<strong>and</strong> reasonable free of non-combatants. In both <strong>the</strong> major insurgencies in which NATO
<strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r western forces are currently engaged this ideal situation is noticeably absent.
Instead, <strong>the</strong> insurgents generate a non-mechanised battle rhythm that requires hardly
any centrally-sourced supplies. They have very few heavy vehicles with unusual rates of
consumption, instead preferring ordinary cars <strong>and</strong> four-wheel-drive vehicles such as <strong>the</strong>
Toyota Hi-Lux. These fast, rugged, economical <strong>and</strong> relatively low-maintenance vehicles
look exactly like those driven by civilians <strong>and</strong> can be fuelled almost anywhere in local
towns <strong>and</strong> villages. The insurgents have few large weapons requiring heavy ammunition
<strong>and</strong> almost none that need to move openly via major roads. Whereas our forces require
<strong>the</strong> forward movement of staggering quantities of food <strong>and</strong> water, <strong>the</strong> insurgents have
no centralised food requirements <strong>and</strong> tend to gain <strong>the</strong>ir sustenance from local village
<strong>and</strong> town sources <strong>and</strong> in such discreet ways that <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgency forces cannot
achieve effective disruption. No less important, <strong>the</strong> insurgents avoid concentrating, much
less moving on open roads along predictable <strong>and</strong> well known routes. Indeed, <strong>the</strong>y tend
to use a maze of small supply <strong>and</strong> movement routes ei<strong>the</strong>r through terrain that causes
surveillance problems to air power assets or through populous villages <strong>and</strong> towns where
<strong>the</strong> insurgents simply disappear amidst civilian traffic. 5
Destroying any “dual-use” roads
<strong>and</strong> bridges is seldom possible for air forces because that would cause highly unwanted
effects on <strong>the</strong> local population’s attitude towards <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgency forces.
These observations are not intended to convey an impression that traditional air power
concepts are entirely inapplicable in today’s insurgency contexts. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, air
forces are recognising <strong>the</strong>se challenges <strong>and</strong> seeking ways of overcoming <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> are
performing as well as can be expected under <strong>the</strong> circumstances. In any case, nei<strong>the</strong>r close
air support nor interdiction is <strong>the</strong> most significant contribution to <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgency
campaigns that our air forces are making. Their most significant contributions are probably
in <strong>the</strong> areas of mobility <strong>and</strong> intelligence <strong>and</strong> situational awareness.
Inter-<strong>the</strong>atre <strong>and</strong> intra-<strong>the</strong>atre airlift provide <strong>the</strong> “lifeblood” of joint counter-insurgency
campaigns. Whereas in <strong>the</strong> Second World War almost all combatants moved between
<strong>the</strong>ir home countries <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> combat <strong>the</strong>atres by ship, nowadays <strong>the</strong>y go by air, along
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”