Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 6
insurgency because of its ability to position manpower where it is required, in a
timely fashion.
• Success in counter-insurgency warfare, especially in <strong>the</strong> complex <strong>and</strong>
ambiguous urban environment, is dependent on reliable <strong>and</strong> timely
intelligence. An insurgency must be defeated in detail, so <strong>the</strong>re is a requirement
for intelligence of a sufficient granularity which allows for an underst<strong>and</strong>ing
of networks <strong>and</strong> unit strengths. In contrast to some o<strong>the</strong>r counter-insurgency
experiences, especially <strong>the</strong> Americans in Vietnam, <strong>the</strong> British HQ staff
understood <strong>the</strong> importance of ORBAT analysis, even when dealing with
“guerrilla forces”.
• <strong>Air</strong> power can have a decisive impact through o<strong>the</strong>r means than attack.
Although some physical attacks were required first, it was appreciated that
“shows of force” could be used as <strong>the</strong> campaign developed. This permitted
an important reduction in <strong>the</strong> number of weapons employed <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore,
destructive effect, which it was realised always looks disproportionate in <strong>the</strong>
urban setting.
• Because of concerns over collateral damage, it was felt important to use
weapons which had sufficient but not excessive destructive force. Machinegun,
cannon <strong>and</strong> armour-piercing rockets were favoured over high explosive
bombs <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r explosive ordnance.
• The provision of humanitarian relief, coupled with day-to-day security, was
identified as an important information operations coup in counter-insurgency
warfare. The Greek example demonstrates that air power can have a potent
“hearts <strong>and</strong> minds” impact, which runs contrary to <strong>the</strong> current accepted
wisdom that only “boots on <strong>the</strong> ground” can have such influence.
• Persistent air power over <strong>the</strong> battlespace had a number of benefits, including
suppressing insurgent activity, providing imagery intelligence, including
picking up insurgent patterns of behaviour, <strong>and</strong> raising <strong>the</strong> morale of
friendly forces.
• Measurement of effect must be thought through extremely carefully. In this
campaign, success was ultimately measured by <strong>the</strong> ability of local Greeks to go
about <strong>the</strong>ir daily business <strong>and</strong> lives without fear of being killed or captured
by insurgent forces. Although attrition inflicted on ELAS forces was used as
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 111