Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>’s Role in Asymmetric Operations: The Case of <strong>the</strong> Second Lebanon War
enduring roles for air power in counter-insurgencies or counter-terrorism operations?
While insurgents or terrorists may be less vulnerable to classic air campaigns, this chapter
concludes that it would be unwise to dispense with air power altoge<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> context of
asymmetric operations.
The Allure of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>
One reason why air power became <strong>the</strong> easy scapegoat is that it was <strong>the</strong> main military
instrument <strong>the</strong> IDF employed during <strong>the</strong> war, <strong>and</strong> it correlated with a disappointing
outcome. At no time during <strong>the</strong> 2006 Lebanon war did Israel signal that it was interested
in introducing large numbers of ground forces. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, ground forces were last resorts that
were never actually seriously considered. Only during <strong>the</strong> last weekend in <strong>the</strong> 34-day war
did Israel mobilise enough reserves <strong>and</strong> promise a ground invasion, just two days before
<strong>the</strong> international community intervened <strong>and</strong> imposed a cease-fire under UN Resolution
1701. 354 Why was Israel’s leadership so persuaded by air power that it was used to <strong>the</strong>
exclusion of ground forces?
Some critics have attributed <strong>the</strong> IDF’s reliance on air power to <strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> Chief
of Staff, General Daniel Halutz. A career <strong>Air</strong> Force officer <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>er of <strong>the</strong> Israeli
<strong>Air</strong> Force (IAF) between 2000 <strong>and</strong> 2004, General Halutz had been overwhelmingly
supportive of air-based campaign plans <strong>and</strong> had sought cuts in ground forces. He had
argued: “Many air operations were generally implemented without a l<strong>and</strong> force, based
on a worldview of western society’s sensitivity to losses. A l<strong>and</strong> force is not sent into
action as long as <strong>the</strong>re is an effective alternative …This obliges us to part with a number
of anachronistic assumptions,” including that l<strong>and</strong> forces are a requirement or victory. 355
In <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> Second Lebanon War, Halutz’s preference for air power translated
into an unwillingness to consider seriously any ground forces o<strong>the</strong>r than pinpoint ground
incursions into Lebanon. 356
While Halutz was certainly of <strong>the</strong> view that air power might obviate <strong>the</strong> need for large
numbers of ground forces, his aversion to ground forces was somewhat reflective of
<strong>the</strong> prevailing caution that had emerged in <strong>the</strong> two decades since Israel’s incursion into
Lebanon during <strong>the</strong> 1980s with <strong>the</strong> First Lebanon War. Fear of becoming mired in <strong>the</strong>
“Lebanese mud” <strong>and</strong> experiencing numerous casualties on <strong>the</strong> ground gradually produced
a “victory from <strong>the</strong> air” <strong>the</strong>sis, replacing what one air power critic has referred to as <strong>the</strong>
“Ben Gurion” model of definitive victory through fierce <strong>and</strong> bold manoeuvring. Israel’s
experiences with a costly eighteen-year occupation of Lebanon after <strong>the</strong> first Lebanon
war had given Israel pause in terms of deploying ground troops back to <strong>the</strong> same region. 357
The intrinsic risk associated with l<strong>and</strong> operations, a risk reinforced by <strong>the</strong> historical
experiences of using ground forces two decades earlier in Lebanon, created operational
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”