Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 8
“<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side because in Afghanistan, you have little chance of survival but in Pakistan
we can always bail you out” <strong>the</strong>y were told. 324 Soviet Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR)
evidently found <strong>the</strong> prospect of operating in Pakistan more appealing than getting <strong>the</strong>ir
aircrews out of danger in Afghanistan, although CSAR was one area that <strong>the</strong> Soviets
refined <strong>and</strong> excelled at during <strong>the</strong> Afghan war.
The introduction of <strong>the</strong> more modern Backfire was apparently out of concern that <strong>the</strong>
Badgers might be vulnerable to attack from <strong>the</strong> Pakistan <strong>Air</strong> Force (PAF). These aircraft
had a maximum altitude of 42,000 ft. (12,800 m.) compared with <strong>the</strong> 43,635 ft. (13,300
m.) of <strong>the</strong> Tu-22. Anecdotal evidence claims that because of <strong>the</strong> proximity of Khost to <strong>the</strong>
Pakistan border, <strong>the</strong> aircraft would have to make a turn just over <strong>the</strong> border after dropping
<strong>the</strong>ir ordnance, before returning to Mary. When <strong>the</strong> Tu-22s attacked targets around Khost,
<strong>the</strong>y were joined by Tu-22PD (“Blinder-E”) aircraft carrying electronic warfare equipment
to jam Pakistani radar. 325
The bomber offensive was largely a failure. In much <strong>the</strong> same way that <strong>the</strong> Luftwaffe had
failed to demoralise London’s population during World War II, <strong>the</strong> efforts of <strong>the</strong> DA had
not degraded public support for <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen <strong>and</strong> instead had merely streng<strong>the</strong>ned
it as <strong>the</strong> rebels took <strong>the</strong> war to <strong>the</strong> Red Army. What it did achieve was large numbers of
civilian casualties <strong>and</strong> destroyed areas of once-lush farml<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> orchards. Meanwhile,
<strong>the</strong> anti-personnel mines which were dropped by tactical aircraft have left a legacy in <strong>the</strong>
country which causes up to 100 casualties per week. 326 Soviet “hearts-<strong>and</strong>-minds” efforts
were absent-minded <strong>and</strong> half-hearted at best during this war, but <strong>the</strong> bomber offensive
did nothing to ender <strong>the</strong> Afghan public to Moscow.
Intelligence <strong>and</strong> Surveillance
The Soviet Army <strong>and</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Force had to be delicate in <strong>the</strong>ir employment of airborne
reconnaissance to monitor <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen. The rebels were, after all, quick learners <strong>and</strong>
flying observation aircraft over <strong>the</strong>ir location could be seen as a harbinger of things to
come by <strong>the</strong> rebels. The border areas between Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan, which contained
<strong>the</strong> favourite infiltration routes for <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen who were able to organise, recruit
<strong>and</strong> equip in <strong>the</strong> massive refugee camps established in Pakistan <strong>and</strong> also Iran, were
watched by photo-reconnaissance aircraft. When such flights were performed, on some
occasions, <strong>the</strong>se aeroplanes were accompanied by A-50 (“Mainstay”) <strong>Air</strong>borne Warning
<strong>and</strong> Control System aircraft which watched <strong>the</strong> skies for any PAF activity. 327 Meanwhile,
An-26RR (“Cub”) signals intelligence aircraft would eavesdrop on <strong>the</strong> various radio nets
used by <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen <strong>and</strong> this information would be fused with photo-recce pictures
<strong>and</strong> human intelligence from Afghan <strong>and</strong> Soviet agents to build a picture of Mujahideen
strengths, weaknesses <strong>and</strong> intent. 328
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 137