Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Unnecessary or Unsung? The Strategic Role of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Britain’s Colonial Counter-Insurgencies
In short, Malaya provided a successful demonstration of <strong>the</strong> flexible <strong>and</strong> multi-functional
utility of helicopters in a small war environment. The troop-deployment <strong>and</strong> medicalevacuation
role that 303 Wing Sycamore <strong>and</strong> Whirlwind helicopters fulfilled in Malaya
would be seen on a much larger scale in future conflicts as o<strong>the</strong>r armed forces noted <strong>the</strong>
advantages of helicopter air power, most obviously within <strong>the</strong> US military as <strong>the</strong> Vietnam
War escalated from an insurgency to an all-out war.
One final indirect role air power executed with beneficial results was aiding <strong>the</strong>
propag<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> psychological side of <strong>the</strong> conflict. A key tactic in this front of <strong>the</strong>
counter-insurgency campaign was <strong>the</strong> use of “voice aircraft,” which would fly over <strong>the</strong>
jungle broadcasting messages to <strong>the</strong> insurgents from load speakers, urging <strong>the</strong>m to
surrender. As <strong>the</strong> war began to turn against <strong>the</strong> MRLA after 1952 <strong>and</strong> morale severely
dipped, <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of this method became obvious. In 1955, questioning revealed
that 100 percent of surrendered enemy personnel stated that <strong>the</strong>y had heard propag<strong>and</strong>a
being broadcast from voice aircraft, many of whom agreed that what <strong>the</strong>y heard played
a large role in <strong>the</strong>ir decision to surrender. 140 “Voice aircraft” covered some 10,000 miles
over <strong>the</strong> duration of <strong>the</strong> Emergency, 141 whilst in 1956 alone <strong>the</strong>y flew 2,246 sorties over
<strong>the</strong> Malayan jungle, conducting “voice” missions as well as dropping over 100 million
leaflets calling upon insurgents to surrender <strong>and</strong> offering financial inducements to give
up arms. The effectiveness of this simple method was witnessed by <strong>the</strong> MCP’s directive
that made it an offence punishable by death for one of <strong>the</strong>ir members to so much as pick
one of <strong>the</strong>m up off <strong>the</strong> jungle floor. 142 Again, here we see <strong>the</strong> contribution being made
from <strong>the</strong> air reaping positive benefits for those fighting insurgents on <strong>the</strong> ground. The
accumulative effect of air power’s indirect role in Malaya truly was an accomplishment
of General Briggs’s vision of air power operating “in conjunction with <strong>and</strong> in support
of <strong>the</strong> ground forces”. Although <strong>the</strong>re is reason to suspect <strong>the</strong> presence of any sizeable
advantage stemming from <strong>the</strong> direct <strong>and</strong> offensive application of air power, <strong>the</strong> essence of
<strong>the</strong> effective utility of air power – indeed, <strong>the</strong> unsung contribution to <strong>the</strong> whole counterinsurgency
effort – lies in <strong>the</strong> multiple uses of indirect air power. From crop-spraying
to propag<strong>and</strong>a distribution, from medical evacuation to deploying troops, <strong>the</strong> indirect
role played by air power in <strong>the</strong> Malayan Emergency offered an “insight into <strong>the</strong> possible
imaginative uses of a small but flexible air component to support <strong>the</strong> larger politicalmilitary
effort in a small war.” 143 Although clearly ancillary to <strong>the</strong> main military focus on
ground operations, <strong>the</strong> wider counter-insurgency strategy was aided considerably by <strong>the</strong>
indirect application of air power.
“Political Dynamite”: <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Kenya
Declared four years into operations in Malaya, <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgency campaign initiated
in response to <strong>the</strong> Kenyan Emergency built upon <strong>the</strong> lessons learned in south-east Asia.
74
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”