Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

The RAF in Counter-<strong>Insurgency</strong> Warfare: British Intervention in Greece, 1944-45
numerical yardstick of campaign success <strong>and</strong> identified as an important
measurement, General Scobie placed most emphasis on <strong>the</strong> local population’s
freedom from fear <strong>and</strong> want, combined with consent of <strong>the</strong> Greek government
<strong>and</strong> wider population.
• The shortage of l<strong>and</strong> forces in this campaign dem<strong>and</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> use of different
strategies to compensate for <strong>the</strong> shortfall, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> air instrument was able
to deliver many of <strong>the</strong> results normally associated with <strong>and</strong> forces. Therefore,
it can be argued that air power can often be used as a substitute for l<strong>and</strong>
power <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> use of air power early in a campaign may radically reduce <strong>the</strong>
requirement for l<strong>and</strong> forces in some scenarios.
• The campaign fulcrum, which turned <strong>the</strong> tide in favour of <strong>the</strong> British-led
effort, was <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>the</strong> Joint HQ <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> co-location of air <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>
planning staffs.
The British involvement in Greece had been a success. One of <strong>the</strong> many delegations
sent to Greece by Churchill concluded that had British forces not intervened, <strong>the</strong>re
would have been a “wholesale massacre in A<strong>the</strong>ns”. 230 However, some writers believe
that this victory was only a “victory of a sort” because <strong>the</strong> Communists were not finished
off <strong>and</strong> made a third bid for power between 1946 <strong>and</strong> 1949. 231
But what such criticism
overlooks is <strong>the</strong> fact that British intervention compelled <strong>the</strong> Communists to reassess <strong>the</strong>ir
strategy. During 1945, <strong>the</strong> Communist Party underwent an internal struggle, between
two factions, one advocating <strong>the</strong> resumption of guerrilla warfare <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r favouring
<strong>the</strong> creation of a regular army. The latter faction won, <strong>and</strong> this sowed <strong>the</strong> seeds of <strong>the</strong>
Communists’ ultimate defeat. By reconfiguring itself into a regular fighting force, ELAS’s
successor, known as <strong>the</strong> Democratic Army (DSE), played into <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> new Greek
Army <strong>and</strong> Greek <strong>Air</strong> Force. 232
It is interesting to note that <strong>the</strong> Greek counter-insurgency
doctrine entitled “Anti-B<strong>and</strong>it Warfare,” which was published first in 1946, gave primacy
to air power as <strong>the</strong> key force multiplier. It also emphasised <strong>the</strong> value of air transport <strong>and</strong>
all-source intelligence. These important doctrinal tenets underpinned subsequent Greek
campaigns, especially <strong>the</strong> large scale “clear <strong>and</strong> hold” operations undertaken by <strong>the</strong> Greek
Army in 1948 <strong>and</strong> 1949. Thus, <strong>the</strong> British experience of 1944 <strong>and</strong> 1945 not only served to
change <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> enemy into something which could be defeated by conventional
forces, but it also provided <strong>the</strong> doctrinal foundations for <strong>the</strong> new Greek armed services
<strong>and</strong> allowed <strong>the</strong>m to develop <strong>the</strong>ir own operational solutions to <strong>the</strong> challenges that
lay ahead. 233
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”