Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Starting with a Blank Sheet: Principles of War for a New Century
1. Take <strong>the</strong> initiative
2. Attack <strong>the</strong> enemy’s weakest point
3. Attack <strong>the</strong> extremities of <strong>the</strong> enemy’s position
4. Concentrate for ease <strong>and</strong> rapidity of movement
5. Force <strong>the</strong> enemy to commit errors
6. Know <strong>the</strong> enemy’s position <strong>and</strong> intentions
7. Mass for effectiveness at <strong>the</strong> decisive point
8. Pursue <strong>the</strong> beaten foe
9. Morale is important
10. Summarizing <strong>the</strong> above: a general should occupy favourable positions, move
quickly, <strong>and</strong> hit hard with great mass.
Over <strong>the</strong> next several decades Jomini would continue to refine his principles, although,
in truth, he moved little beyond <strong>the</strong> ten noted above. It has been argued, however, that
because of Jomini’s long life, his relatively straight-forward <strong>and</strong> uncluttered prose, <strong>and</strong>
<strong>the</strong> fact that he wrote in French – at that time <strong>the</strong> lingua franca for <strong>the</strong> learned of <strong>the</strong> west
– his influence was great. I would note that in contrast, Clausewitz died relatively young,
wrote in a confusing, redundant <strong>and</strong> contradictory fashion, <strong>and</strong> published in German.
Thus, Jomini beat him on all three counts. Some contend that it was Jomini’s Précis that
accompanied Union <strong>and</strong> Confederate generals to battle in <strong>the</strong> American Civil War. 464
The nineteenth century was a particularly rich period for military thought. Staff <strong>and</strong>
war colleges, along with various branch schools– such as infantry, cavalry <strong>and</strong> artillery
– were founded in most European countries as well as <strong>the</strong> US. Partly this was due to a
drive to rationalise war; as well as all o<strong>the</strong>r aspects of life. This was <strong>the</strong> age of managerial
<strong>and</strong> administrative revolutions that attempted to treat <strong>the</strong> complex processes of life as
scientific problems that could be overcome with rationality, organization <strong>and</strong> technology.
It was no coincidence that was also <strong>the</strong> era when general staffs were formed in most
major armies. 465 The era also gave birth to a number of <strong>the</strong>orists who continued to refine
ideas for warfare, including such notables as Ferdin<strong>and</strong> Foch, Colmar von der Goltz,
Ardant du Picq, G F R Henderson, <strong>and</strong>, significantly, naval <strong>the</strong>orists Alfred Thayer Mahan
<strong>and</strong> Julian Corbett.
Most unfortunately, however, all of this useful thought did little to avert <strong>the</strong> catastrophe of
World War I. If <strong>the</strong> internalization of Principles of War was intended to minimise mistakes
by comm<strong>and</strong>ing generals, <strong>the</strong>y failed in <strong>the</strong>ir primary task. Alan Clark evocatively referred
to “<strong>the</strong> donkeys” of <strong>the</strong> Great War who seemed unable to think beyond what I would
argue was Clausewitz’s prime directive: find <strong>and</strong> destroy <strong>the</strong> enemy army. 466
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”