Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 12
in <strong>the</strong> history of counter-insurgency – Harding failed to bring <strong>the</strong> isl<strong>and</strong> under control
<strong>and</strong> failed to capture <strong>the</strong> leader of <strong>the</strong> Cypriot insurgents. Harding left <strong>the</strong> isl<strong>and</strong> in 1957,
believing that <strong>the</strong> tide had turned <strong>and</strong> that outright victory was around <strong>the</strong> corner. The
next year <strong>the</strong> British government agreed to grant Cyprus independence, <strong>and</strong> also granted
full amnesty for <strong>the</strong> insurgents.
The contrast between <strong>the</strong> two soldiers in counter-insurgency illustrates some basic
principles of leadership. One soldier, Templer, adjusted to <strong>the</strong> conditions of counterinsurgency
<strong>and</strong> always kept <strong>the</strong> political issues in mind. Under his administration in
Malaya <strong>the</strong> political ramifications of every decision were carefully considered. He listened
<strong>and</strong> took advice from some top experts. Templer was a great success. Harding saw <strong>the</strong>
Cyprus insurgency as primarily a military operation with a military solution. That was
his downfall. He had a special talent for ignoring good advice. His strong-arm tactics
put a bad face on British imperialism <strong>and</strong> left behind a legacy of communal violence that
persists today. 501
Counter-insurgency <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Media
One of <strong>the</strong> most common critiques made by officers involved in counter-insurgency
operations around <strong>the</strong> world is that <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgent forces are doing very poorly in
employing <strong>the</strong> media to get <strong>the</strong> government message out; while <strong>the</strong> insurgent, terrorist,
<strong>and</strong> radical groups are using <strong>the</strong> media very effectively. 502 For one thing, insurgents, radical
groups, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> states that support <strong>the</strong>m, are not hindered by any requirement to stick to
<strong>the</strong> truth. Disinformation campaigns <strong>and</strong> deliberate falsifications are st<strong>and</strong>ard methods of
attacking <strong>the</strong> legitimacy of counter-insurgency operations, <strong>and</strong> in whipping up local <strong>and</strong>
world opinion against <strong>the</strong> US <strong>and</strong> coalition allies.
The effective use of <strong>the</strong> mass media by revolutionaries <strong>and</strong> insurgents is nothing new.
Richard McKenna’s insightful 1962 novel, The S<strong>and</strong> Pebbles, depicts <strong>the</strong> confusion <strong>and</strong>
frustration of US military officers on a gunboat in Chinese waters when <strong>the</strong>y confronted
<strong>the</strong> mass propag<strong>and</strong>a campaign of <strong>the</strong> Chinese revolutionaries in <strong>the</strong> 1920s. McKenna
had been a US Navy “China sailor” in that era, <strong>and</strong> had lived many of <strong>the</strong> events described
in his novel. His description of <strong>the</strong> revolutionaries’ use of newspapers <strong>and</strong> pamphlets
rings true for any US officer confronting irregular warfare today. In <strong>the</strong> novel, Lieutenant
Collins USN, Captain of <strong>the</strong> USS San Pablo, a gunboat stationed on <strong>the</strong> Yangtze River in
1926, tells his crew about new orders restricting <strong>the</strong>ir operations:
For instance, our little sortie against <strong>the</strong> river pirates last month, <strong>the</strong>y
fired first, <strong>and</strong> we killed only one pirate. Yet <strong>the</strong> consul has a clipping
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 215