Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 9
insurgents are unable to mass for a raid or generate any sort of conventional response
without being detected. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> authors note, neighbouring countries that might
be inclined to meddle with conventional forces, are also deterred. 398 While this argument
is not entirely convincing, since <strong>the</strong> western militaries fight conventional conflicts more
successfully than asymmetric ones, it is none<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong> case that a strong air force at
least bounds <strong>the</strong> instruments available to an adversary by being a deterrent to <strong>the</strong> use of
conventional forces.
Third, in addition to <strong>the</strong>se advantages, air forces play key support roles in terms of airlift,
comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control, refuelling, ISR, evacuation, <strong>and</strong> logistics supply, less direct but
equally important supporting roles. <strong>Air</strong>borne surveillance, for example, might track <strong>the</strong>
adversary’s movements <strong>and</strong> guide ground forces towards enemy weapons caches, with
<strong>the</strong> aid of airborne fire support. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) especially <strong>the</strong>
Predator, Global Hawk, Reaper, <strong>and</strong> airborne satellite assets may add to <strong>the</strong>se advantages
because <strong>the</strong>y can penetrate deep into enemy terrain <strong>and</strong> collect ISR against <strong>the</strong> adversary,
providing tactical advantages. In terms of logistics supply, air forces can help protect supply
lines against guerrillas. Commenting on <strong>the</strong> importance of air power in this context, one
air power analyst noted that without air forces in Afghanistan, “US <strong>and</strong> NATO bases
would become little Dienbienphus. Afghan’s previous invaders, <strong>the</strong> British <strong>and</strong> Soviets,
were defeated by <strong>the</strong>ir ability to protect <strong>the</strong>ir long lines of communications.” 399
The objective with this analysis is not to vindicate air power in irregular warfare settings
but ra<strong>the</strong>r to demonstrate that <strong>the</strong> choice between air power <strong>and</strong> ground forces is
not binary. While air power may have fewer direct roles as it does in conventional air
campaigns, <strong>the</strong> experiences with Israel in Lebanon should not be generalised too broadly
to dismiss <strong>the</strong> utility of air power in this setting altoge<strong>the</strong>r. As <strong>the</strong> international coalition
has demonstrated in <strong>the</strong>atres such as Afghanistan, air assets may not be assuming <strong>the</strong>
direct roles as do <strong>the</strong> army <strong>and</strong> marine assets on <strong>the</strong> ground, but are a critical instrument
as part of a joint air-ground campaign, even in an irregular warfare setting.
Conclusions
Given <strong>the</strong> limited effects of air power against asymmetric adversaries, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> domestically
<strong>and</strong> internationally unpopular prospect of using ground forces against Hezbollah, what
were Israel’s strategic options? The Israeli government could not st<strong>and</strong> by <strong>and</strong> appear to
do nothing when bombs were falling on Israeli towns <strong>and</strong> soldiers were being captured.
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> government, new to office <strong>and</strong> seeking to fill <strong>the</strong> large shoes left by General
Sharon, was right to assert its right of self-defence <strong>and</strong> retaliate in some way. While air
power offered a way to demonstrate leadership resolve <strong>and</strong> appeal to society’s interest
in doing something – without <strong>the</strong> need to mount legislative <strong>and</strong> civilian support for <strong>the</strong>
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 155