Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 9
personality behind which a much augmented population base followed. 390 The combined
effect of <strong>the</strong> increased means of disposal, plus <strong>the</strong> increased strength of will, served to
raise <strong>the</strong> cost of victory to Israel.
Where <strong>the</strong> media also came into play was in eroding <strong>the</strong> strength of <strong>the</strong> will on <strong>the</strong> part
of Israelis <strong>and</strong> its close ally, <strong>the</strong> US. Most of <strong>the</strong> international community agreed that in
principle, retaliation against Hezbollah for capturing two Israeli soldiers was justified. 391
Yet as <strong>the</strong> conflict continued <strong>and</strong> Hezbollah members began positioning <strong>the</strong>mselves so
<strong>the</strong>y could document footage of Israel destroying civilian assets – which often contained
weapons that Hezbollah could use against Israel, such as katyusha rockets – questions
of proportionality began to arise. This assertion does not weigh in on whe<strong>the</strong>r Israel’s
approach was entirely proportional, but does make <strong>the</strong> claim that Hezbollah used <strong>the</strong>
ambiguity of <strong>the</strong> proportionality doctrine to <strong>the</strong>ir advantage, largely through projections
in <strong>the</strong> media. The Israeli government later acknowledged that <strong>the</strong> images of IDF raids in
Beirut <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> resulting civilian damage eroded its international support over <strong>the</strong> course
of <strong>the</strong> conflict. 392
Gradually, members of <strong>the</strong> international community began to question <strong>the</strong> proportionality,
a trend that peaked with <strong>the</strong> ill-fated attack on <strong>the</strong> Lebanese town of Qana. The collateral
damage inflicted on Qana – almost inevitable given that Hezbollah was fighting from
within densely-populated civilian areas– prompted widespread criticism of Israel’s
approach to <strong>the</strong> conflict. International reactions to <strong>the</strong> attack caused Israel to suspend air
strikes for 48-hours, but <strong>the</strong> implications of <strong>the</strong> attack went beyond Israeli foreign policy.
The attacks “illustrated in heart-breaking images <strong>the</strong> enormous risks for <strong>the</strong> United States
in <strong>the</strong> current Middle East crisis.” 393 The US was already in a difficult position of on <strong>the</strong>
one h<strong>and</strong> seeking to support its ally, but on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r trying to mitigate anti-Americanism
in a region with high strategic importance. Negotiating that balance became more
difficult “with each new scene of carnage in sou<strong>the</strong>rn Lebanon,” 394 particularly Qana.
While <strong>the</strong> US formally maintained its support for Israel, <strong>the</strong>se incidents <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> images
that followed no doubt shortened <strong>the</strong> timeline that it would support Israel’s prosecution
of <strong>the</strong> war, which in turn fur<strong>the</strong>r constrained Israel’s strategic options.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Asymmetric Operations
Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>the</strong> difficulties experienced in <strong>the</strong> Second Lebanon War, air power has
important contributions to make in a variety of settings. <strong>Air</strong> power may be useful for
strategic attack, counter-air – achieving air superiority – counter-space, counter-l<strong>and</strong> in
a large-scale ground operations (air interdiction or close air support), counter-sea, <strong>and</strong>
counter-information. 395 But <strong>the</strong> traditional doctrine on air power makes <strong>the</strong> assumption
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 153