Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Insurgency</strong>: Early RAF Doctrine
<strong>the</strong> public arena. The latter certainly saw debate both within <strong>the</strong> press <strong>and</strong> Parliament
on <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>and</strong> humanity, or lack of it, occasioned by <strong>the</strong> use of air power for
empire policing. The fact that <strong>the</strong> main areas of operation for <strong>the</strong> RAF <strong>the</strong>n, are <strong>the</strong> same
areas that we are involved with today should also not be overlooked. All in all, <strong>the</strong>re are
enough parallels between operations in <strong>the</strong> inter-war years <strong>and</strong> those today to justify <strong>the</strong>
relevance of this as an area of interest to current airmen.
To begin with, it is important to have some underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> strategic backdrop
against which <strong>the</strong> doctrine to be considered was developed. It is no exaggeration to say
that to a great extent <strong>the</strong> COIN role, more generally referred to as “air control” or “air
policing” at <strong>the</strong> time, was <strong>the</strong> saving grace for <strong>the</strong> RAF in <strong>the</strong> early to mid 1920s. 33 It is
worth remembering that <strong>the</strong> RAF was not regarded as a permanent part of <strong>the</strong> defence
establishment at this time, with advocates of both <strong>the</strong> Army <strong>and</strong> Navy pressing, each
for <strong>the</strong>ir own reasons, for <strong>the</strong> disestablishment of <strong>the</strong> RAF <strong>and</strong> return of its resources,
both people <strong>and</strong> equipment, to <strong>the</strong>m. Indeed, Trenchard was to spend much of his time
as Chief of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Staff simply trying to keep <strong>the</strong> RAF in being, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> success of air
control provided a very powerful argument which could be deployed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Ministry
in defence of <strong>the</strong> Service; which was that it had introduced new ways of working that
significantly reduced <strong>the</strong> costs of running <strong>the</strong> Empire. And whilst arguments based on
<strong>the</strong> war-winning capabilities of future bomber forces were highly <strong>the</strong>oretical in <strong>the</strong> 1920s,
which happened to be <strong>the</strong> time when <strong>the</strong> RAF faced its severest challenges, <strong>the</strong> realities
of economies produced by <strong>the</strong> Service on an Imperial scale were something which both
politicians <strong>and</strong> civil servants in <strong>the</strong> Treasury could underst<strong>and</strong>. 34 Hence <strong>the</strong> reason for <strong>the</strong>
early RAF being so insistent that in any such operation <strong>the</strong> RAF had to have <strong>the</strong> overall
comm<strong>and</strong>. It needed <strong>the</strong> credibility that success in this area would bring. Indeed, <strong>the</strong>
matter was so important that Trenchard issued a specific paper for <strong>the</strong> Imperial Defence
Council to consider on <strong>the</strong> subject under his own name, after leaving <strong>the</strong> post of CAS. 35
A reasonable question would be to ask what doctrine actually existed during this era,
<strong>and</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r it provided any useful guidance on <strong>the</strong> subject of COIN. In order to answer
this it is necessary to have a degree of underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> various sources of doctrine
which exist from <strong>the</strong> period, toge<strong>the</strong>r with o<strong>the</strong>r sources which can provide insights
into <strong>the</strong> way that <strong>the</strong> RAF thought about its own purpose <strong>and</strong> use. The first <strong>and</strong> prime
documents, at least in absolute hierarchical terms, are <strong>the</strong> two manuals which provided
<strong>the</strong> official line in terms of RAF thinking on <strong>the</strong> use of air power, or air warfare as it was
more generally termed at <strong>the</strong> time. The first of <strong>the</strong>se arrived in 1922, under <strong>the</strong> title of <strong>the</strong>
“Operations Manual” for <strong>the</strong> Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force, or “Confidential Document 22” (CD 22) as it
was alternatively titled. 36 This in turn was replaced in 1928 by <strong>Air</strong> Publication 1300, or <strong>the</strong>
“Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force War Manual,” which would last, albeit in four different editions <strong>and</strong> in
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”