Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 3
(<strong>and</strong> efforts to destabilise those local leaders who supported British rule) it proved a
relatively straightforward task for air control. However, <strong>the</strong> direct involvement of o<strong>the</strong>r
states, which saw <strong>the</strong> dispute with Yemen as an opportunity to pursue wider aims, made
this an ever more difficult <strong>and</strong> complex challenge that required increasing force to resolve.
The second threat to air control came from within <strong>the</strong> colony itself. The rise of Arab
nationalism encouraged many to question <strong>the</strong> legitimacy of British rule. In <strong>the</strong>se
circumstances, <strong>the</strong> decision to replace air control by robust military action merely served
to emphasise <strong>the</strong> fragility of British governance. It also did little to encourage affection for
continued British rule.
At its core, air control was about achieving political ra<strong>the</strong>r than physical effect. This focus
was steadily lost through <strong>the</strong> late 1940s <strong>and</strong> early 1950s as <strong>the</strong> RAF’s role turned from
policing into war-fighting. <strong>Air</strong> control was not a flawed concept nor was it incapable of
dealing with insurgencies. Yet it was no more than a tool to enhance <strong>and</strong> sustain <strong>the</strong>
Government’s authority. When that authority was discredited <strong>the</strong>re was little that air
power, <strong>and</strong> military operations in general, could do to retrieve <strong>the</strong> situation.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 63