Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 6
of Piraeus, so any friendly shipping had to offload over <strong>the</strong> beaches in this adjacent bay.
The successful airdrop over a seventeen day period increased troop numbers by 2,719
personnel, provided 831 tons of ammunition, <strong>and</strong> 291 tons of stores. This allowed <strong>the</strong> first
offensive action from inside A<strong>the</strong>ns, which was supported by an increased air presence.
The number of squadrons increased from three to eight (including two Spitfire units, <strong>and</strong>
two Beaufighter squadrons, one of which was armed with rockets). This reinforcement
enabled friendly l<strong>and</strong> forces to take <strong>the</strong> initiative in a number of zones in <strong>the</strong> centre of
<strong>the</strong> city, <strong>and</strong>, perhaps most crucially for <strong>the</strong> long-term success of <strong>the</strong> campaign, <strong>the</strong> air
re-supply operation also brought in much-needed food supplies. British forces were
compelled to feed <strong>the</strong> local civilians who were caught inside <strong>the</strong> “green zone,” <strong>and</strong> after
<strong>the</strong> insurgents cut off electricity <strong>and</strong> water supplies to <strong>the</strong> centre of A<strong>the</strong>ns, <strong>the</strong> plight of
<strong>the</strong>se civilians became very serious, especially as <strong>the</strong> winter of 1944 was particularly harsh.
The provision of soup kitchens throughout <strong>the</strong> city centre proved to be a major “hearts
<strong>and</strong> minds” coup for <strong>the</strong> British forces, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> RAF, in particular, came to be identified
with this humanitarian relief. The RAF was referred to, generically, as <strong>the</strong> “winged saviour”
<strong>and</strong> this positive view of <strong>the</strong> RAF grew as <strong>the</strong> campaign developed, because <strong>the</strong> RAF
was also seen increasingly to provide day-to-day security. These two factors, in t<strong>and</strong>em,
did much to turn local opinion against <strong>the</strong> Communist insurgency <strong>and</strong> consolidated <strong>the</strong>
average A<strong>the</strong>nian’s view of <strong>the</strong> British presence, namely, that British forces were <strong>the</strong>re to
support <strong>the</strong> legitimate Greek government <strong>and</strong> to preserve democracy. It is an important
early example of air power’s ability to have a positive influence; it is usually assumed that
only “boots on <strong>the</strong> ground” can achieve “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds” successes. 214
However, <strong>the</strong> military situation was still finely balanced <strong>and</strong> between 18 <strong>and</strong> 20 December
ELAS attempted a counter-offensive. Although this was beaten back in most quarters,
<strong>the</strong> significance of <strong>the</strong> Communist action was that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> HQ, which was located in <strong>the</strong>
north-eastern suburb of A<strong>the</strong>ns called Kiffissia, was overrun by ELAS. 215
This appeared
to spell disaster for <strong>the</strong> British effort. However, in <strong>the</strong> longer term, it sowed <strong>the</strong> seeds
of success. The capture of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> HQ compelled a complete conceptual rethinking of
<strong>Air</strong> Support in <strong>the</strong> campaign. A temporary <strong>Air</strong> HQ was located initially near <strong>the</strong> coast,
but <strong>the</strong>n a combined Advanced <strong>and</strong> Rear <strong>Air</strong> HQ was co-located inside <strong>the</strong> principal
British HQ within <strong>the</strong> “green zone,” <strong>and</strong> this took over <strong>the</strong> burden of air planning <strong>and</strong>
tasking. This new <strong>Air</strong> HQ was connected to <strong>the</strong> main airfield five miles to <strong>the</strong> south-east
via secure VHF radio. A Joint <strong>Air</strong>-L<strong>and</strong> planning team began to think about <strong>the</strong> urban
context in three dimensions. <strong>Air</strong> Liaison Officers got inside <strong>the</strong> heads of <strong>the</strong>ir L<strong>and</strong>
opposite numbers, <strong>and</strong> vice versa. Toge<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>y developed a Joint plan for clearing <strong>the</strong>
centre of A<strong>the</strong>ns. It was a “hot house” environment in <strong>the</strong> Joint HQ, largely <strong>the</strong> result of a
besieged HQ setting, but <strong>the</strong> planning product proved just how much could be achieved
by Staffs under pressure. Whereas <strong>the</strong> RAF had been largely reactive to Army requests for
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 103