Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Unnecessary or Unsung? The Strategic Role of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Britain’s Colonial Counter-Insurgencies
Reflections
Billy Mitchell defined air power as <strong>the</strong> ability to do something in <strong>the</strong> air, 154 <strong>and</strong> its history
has shown that <strong>the</strong>re is great debate about what that something should be. What our
case studies demonstrate is that even at an early stage, air power could provide a variety
of purposes which helped ground forces fight insurgents, in a direct offensive way as
envisaged by Mitchell, but more tellingly in an indirect way that persuaded politicians
<strong>and</strong> some segments of <strong>the</strong> public that air power provided important ways of operating.
We must offer a few caveats. Our case studies are imperial in context. Concern over <strong>the</strong>
manner of killing insurgents <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> targeting of civilian populations caused little real
emotion amongst <strong>the</strong> political classes. This is not <strong>the</strong> case today. There is a more judicious
appreciation of <strong>the</strong> body count on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side. A second caveat is that <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong>
media is incredibly different today. Even if atrocities were part <strong>and</strong> parcel of <strong>the</strong> air wars
of <strong>the</strong> 1940s, <strong>the</strong>re were few journalists to describe or sensationalise <strong>the</strong> accounts. Thus,
politicians could ignore <strong>the</strong> human cost of air power. Although here we would like to
note that one of <strong>the</strong> strange or particular features of our recent research is <strong>the</strong> absence
of appreciation for a) airmen <strong>and</strong> b) those who have fought in colonial wars. A third
caveat relates to race. As Mark Twain argued, we cannot judge men except against <strong>the</strong>ir
own times as opposed to ours. What is striking in <strong>the</strong>se campaigns was <strong>the</strong> desire to use
air power to intimidate <strong>the</strong> opposition, not just in terms of potential fatalities although
<strong>the</strong>se were real enough, but in terms of <strong>the</strong> propag<strong>and</strong>a which played upon local ideas
of tradition <strong>and</strong> faith. Also, <strong>the</strong> racism apparent in colonial campaigns was very real
(arguably not <strong>the</strong> case today).
We have seemingly moved on in a couple of those categories. Yet let us assert a few
constants. <strong>Air</strong> power is used by politicians to fulfil a variety of functions. Not least of
<strong>the</strong>se is to seize <strong>the</strong> initiative <strong>and</strong> act in support of ground troops, but <strong>the</strong>re is always
<strong>the</strong> publicity element for politicians. Let us take <strong>the</strong> bombing of <strong>the</strong> Tora Bora mountain
range in Afghanistan which almost certainly did not kill bin Laden but may have made
western politicians feel better. The second is that air power seems to offer <strong>the</strong> perfect
way of war for politicians who might want to inflict casualties but take relatively few.
The Vietnam Syndrome has taken on a new form via <strong>the</strong> Virtual Wars of <strong>the</strong> 1990s to
ensure that air power now provides a means of achieving strategic objectives without so
many damaging newspaper headlines. A third constant is that air power is a duel-edged
sword – it might actually militate against hearts <strong>and</strong> minds given <strong>the</strong> prominent role
granted it by politicians. “Collateral damage” is a now term indelibly associated to <strong>the</strong>
wanton use of air power <strong>and</strong> is hung round <strong>the</strong> neck of western democracies by <strong>the</strong>ir
enemies as proof of aggression against civilian populations, although admittedly this has
more to do with <strong>the</strong> increasing influence <strong>and</strong> abundance of <strong>the</strong> media than it has to
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”