Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 7
The distinction is, however, an important one given <strong>the</strong> dynamics of counter-insurgency.
For <strong>the</strong> US in Vietnam, this distinction proved crucial. Making <strong>the</strong> war unendurable for
<strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese people was something <strong>the</strong> administration very much hoped very
much to avoid. According to Schelling, “corresponding resistance” to coercion “cannot
always be avoided, <strong>and</strong> if it cannot, <strong>the</strong> compellent threat defeats itself.” 280 In <strong>the</strong> case
of Ranch H<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> resistance came not only from <strong>the</strong> NLF but also from <strong>the</strong> South
Vietnamese. What was designed to be a campaign of denial targeting NLF forces devolved
into what <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese experienced as a punitive strategy. Although he does not
offer analysis as detailed as Pape’s, Schelling’s focus on <strong>the</strong> local populace provides a
dimension that Pape’s account does not.
According to Kirshner, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> was unlikely to have succeeded. For Kirshner, one
measure of a sanction’s strength is its robustness. He defines this as “how <strong>the</strong> power
of sanctions is affected by actions taken by third parties, as well as <strong>the</strong> defenses of <strong>the</strong>
target state.” 281 The US’ de facto sanction against <strong>the</strong> NLF was not robust, according to
Kirshner’s criteria; <strong>the</strong> NLF was still able to move freely <strong>and</strong> could comm<strong>and</strong>eer food
from <strong>the</strong> local people.
More importantly, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> did not meet a key criterion of successful sanction.
“Identifying <strong>and</strong> targeting <strong>the</strong> right groups is <strong>the</strong> key to maximizing <strong>the</strong> chances that
sanctions will be successful.” The South Vietnamese <strong>the</strong>mselves suffered under Ranch
H<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> thus were a target, albeit unintended. Targeting civilians as part of a counterinsurgency
effort virtually ensures its failure. Operation Ranch H<strong>and</strong> contributed to <strong>the</strong>
US’ loss of <strong>the</strong> battle for “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds”.
Ranch H<strong>and</strong> provides cautionary lessons for <strong>the</strong> use of air power in counter-insurgency.
First, <strong>the</strong> logistical challenges alone, from <strong>the</strong> selection of appropriate targets to accurate
spraying, made Ranch H<strong>and</strong> a poor choice for retaining <strong>the</strong> allegiance of <strong>the</strong> South
Vietnamese. The US’ reliance on <strong>the</strong> sclerotic Diệm government for such complicated
tasks as resettlement <strong>and</strong> re-supply made <strong>the</strong> problem even worse.
Secondly, as a number of authors observe, insurgencies require relatively little
infrastructure or supplies. 283 Insurgent forces thus find <strong>the</strong>ir requirements easily met,
even during coercion by denial. Ranch H<strong>and</strong> did not cut off enough of <strong>the</strong> food supply
to coerce <strong>the</strong> NLF; to do so would likely have required a great deal more spraying <strong>and</strong>
destruction of <strong>the</strong> food supplies in North Vietnam as well as in <strong>the</strong> south.
Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most important lesson of Ranch H<strong>and</strong> is that <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> local
population is critical for counter-insurgency, <strong>and</strong> that losing support can be an
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 125