Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 5
before had combat <strong>and</strong> logistic air support been woven into <strong>the</strong> fabric of a campaign”. 166
Thus, aeroplanes were critical in all aspects of <strong>the</strong> campaign: communication, logistics,
intelligence, as well as combat.
Since two-way radio communication was new <strong>and</strong> not yet practical in <strong>the</strong> mountains,
<strong>the</strong> ground patrols in <strong>the</strong> rugged wilderness of <strong>the</strong> Segovias had no easy way to
communicate with <strong>the</strong>ir comm<strong>and</strong> positions or with each o<strong>the</strong>r. The aeroplane made
it possible for <strong>the</strong> first time for <strong>the</strong>se patrols to stay in regular contact <strong>and</strong> to coordinate
<strong>the</strong>ir activities. Aeroplanes tried to fly at least once a day over each patrol.
Messages would be dropped. The ground patrol had two ways of communicating with
<strong>the</strong> aeroplanes. It could place large cloth panels on <strong>the</strong> ground. These had different
colours <strong>and</strong> symbols which would convey information to <strong>the</strong> pilots. Or it could suspend
a message on a line ten to twelve feet off <strong>the</strong> ground. The aeroplane would fly close
to <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> observer would use a long grapple line to retrieve <strong>the</strong> message.
Major Rowell described <strong>the</strong> importance of this communication when he noted: “It fell
to <strong>the</strong> lot of <strong>the</strong> aeroplanes to bind <strong>the</strong> organization toge<strong>the</strong>r, to make it a whole, <strong>and</strong> to
make it possible to function as an organization.” 167
Re-supplying <strong>the</strong> isolated posts <strong>and</strong> patrols was very difficult. Ground transportation
was slow, if at all possible, <strong>and</strong> dangerous. Again aeroplanes filled <strong>the</strong> void. Millions
of pounds of freight were flown into <strong>the</strong> Segovias. In just one week in August 1928
aeroplanes delivered 68,614 pounds. 168 This cargo included food, munitions, clothing
<strong>and</strong> medicine. Occasionally medicines that needed to be kept refrigerated would be
airlifted to help <strong>the</strong> wounded in very isolated patrols. Money was delivered for pay <strong>and</strong>
local purchasing of goods. Troops were also transported by air <strong>and</strong> many wounded were
airlifted to medical facilities.
Intelligence was ano<strong>the</strong>r task assigned to Marine aviators. Aeroplanes made regular
reconnaissance flights over <strong>the</strong> Segovias in an attempt to discern S<strong>and</strong>inista movements.
They also undertook aerial mapping <strong>and</strong> photography. Major Rowell also noted that
<strong>the</strong>y were involved in propag<strong>and</strong>a campaigns by dropping thous<strong>and</strong>s of leaflets over <strong>the</strong>
region. While he claims this was “really effective,” one can question its usefulness since
over ninety percent of <strong>the</strong> population was illiterate. 169
Marine aviation also performed an essential combat function. In <strong>the</strong> first year of <strong>the</strong> war
<strong>the</strong> Marine aviators were involved in 86 combat missions, during which <strong>the</strong>y dropped
514 bombs <strong>and</strong> fired 150,000 rounds of ammunition. 170 Learning a lesson from <strong>the</strong> battle
of Ocotal, S<strong>and</strong>ino dispersed his followers into small guerrilla columns. Thus, <strong>the</strong>re were
only a few opportunities to attack large S<strong>and</strong>inista troop concentrations. In January 1928
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 87