Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Techniques <strong>and</strong> Gadgets, Hearts <strong>and</strong> Minds: An Analysis of Operation Ranch H<strong>and</strong>
success. Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith sent <strong>the</strong> President an acerbic, <strong>and</strong>
prescient, cable on 20 November 1961:
We have just proposed to help Diem in various ways in return
for a promise of administrative <strong>and</strong> political reforms. Since <strong>the</strong>
administrative (<strong>and</strong> possibly) political ineffectuality are <strong>the</strong> strategic
factors for success <strong>the</strong> ability to get reforms is decisive. With <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>
new aid <strong>and</strong> gadgetry will be useful. Without <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>the</strong> helicopters,
planes, <strong>and</strong> advisers [sic] won’t make appreciable difference. 251
Despite this, Kennedy made <strong>the</strong> decision to proceed. On 29 November 1961 <strong>the</strong> first C-123
outfitted for Operation Ranch H<strong>and</strong> with spray nozzles <strong>and</strong> tanks l<strong>and</strong>ed in Vietnam. 252
On 30 November 1961, Kennedy issued NASM 115, approving <strong>the</strong> use of defoliants on
<strong>the</strong> recommendation of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara <strong>and</strong> Deputy Defense
Secretary Roswell Gilpatric. The memor<strong>and</strong>um called for:
a selective <strong>and</strong> carefully controlled joint program of defoliant
operations in Viet Nam starting with <strong>the</strong> clearance of key routes <strong>and</strong>
proceeding <strong>the</strong>reafter to food denial only if <strong>the</strong> most careful basis of
resettlement <strong>and</strong> alternative food supply has been created. 253
NASM 115 required a level of precision that was not possible. The logistics of chemical
spraying were daunting for several reasons, including a lack of equipment <strong>and</strong> imprecise
target selection. Although <strong>the</strong> USAF used C-123s, <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese conducted <strong>the</strong>ir
spraying missions with helicopters. As late as April 1963, <strong>the</strong> US Embassy in Saigon was
suggesting that <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese did not have enough helicopters allocated for a
particular sortie. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> few <strong>the</strong>y did have could not be defended from NLF
attacks. This meant that <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese <strong>Air</strong> Force could not spray <strong>the</strong> targeted
rice, corn, <strong>and</strong> manioc before <strong>the</strong> fall harvest. The telegram proposed that <strong>the</strong> US use
its C-123s, disguised with South Vietnamese markings to obscure US involvement. 254 To
fur<strong>the</strong>r complicate <strong>the</strong> operation, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> required that <strong>the</strong> MC-1 Hourglass spray
unit installed in some C-123s operate with flow rates in excess of its design capability. 255
Target selection remained particularly puzzling. An agenda prepared for <strong>the</strong> Taylor Mission
only a few weeks before Ranch H<strong>and</strong> started had, as one of its action items: “What are
<strong>the</strong> hard facts with regard to <strong>the</strong> VC insurgency? Tactics? Location? Routes of infiltration?
Sources of supply?” 256 A month later, details about <strong>the</strong> existing levels of infiltration, such
as <strong>the</strong> number of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> rate at which <strong>the</strong>y
entered <strong>the</strong> south, were still vague. 257
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”