Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 7
Techniques <strong>and</strong> Gadgets, Hearts <strong>and</strong> Minds:
An Analysis of Operation Ranch H<strong>and</strong>
Evelyn Krache Morris
Operation Ranch H<strong>and</strong>, one of <strong>the</strong> Vietnam war’s longest air campaigns, has
received much less attention than ei<strong>the</strong>r Operation Rolling Thunder or
Operation Linebacker. Unlike those campaigns, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> involved <strong>the</strong> use
of unconventional weapons, including defoliants, in South Vietnam from 1961 until 1971.
What scholarship <strong>the</strong>re is on Ranch H<strong>and</strong> generally falls within studies of <strong>the</strong> legal <strong>and</strong>
moral implications of <strong>the</strong> United States’ use of defoliants, napalm <strong>and</strong> gases. 236 Relatively
little has been written on <strong>the</strong> campaign’s strategic effectiveness.
President John F Kennedy’s administration began <strong>the</strong> campaign in late 1961 as part of
an effort to thwart National Liberation Front (NLF) movements in South Vietnam. Ranch
H<strong>and</strong> proved ultimately ineffective <strong>and</strong>, by some measures, actually harmful to US efforts
in Vietnam. Not only were <strong>the</strong> NLF not deterred in <strong>the</strong>ir infiltration <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir food supply
not materially affected, but <strong>the</strong> public relations damage, both within <strong>the</strong> United States
<strong>and</strong> internationally, was enormous. More importantly, Ranch H<strong>and</strong> helped to alienate
many South Vietnamese from <strong>the</strong>ir government <strong>and</strong> from <strong>the</strong> US, undermining critical
support for a successful counter-insurgency campaign.
Ranch H<strong>and</strong> is a useful case study of <strong>the</strong> efficacy of coercion by denial in counterinsurgency.
Based on <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories of Robert Pape <strong>and</strong> Thomas Schelling, coercion by
denial through <strong>the</strong> use of air power, as <strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration attempted with Ranch
H<strong>and</strong>, was extremely unlikely to induce <strong>the</strong> North Vietnamese to ab<strong>and</strong>on <strong>the</strong>ir fight for
<strong>the</strong> unification of a free Vietnam. 237 Defoliation to deny ground cover did not stop North
Vietnamese infiltration. As economist Jonathan Kirshner outlines in “The Microfoundations
of Economic Sanctions,” food interdiction was probably equally ineffective as a counterinsurgency
strategy. 238 In addition, trying to coerce <strong>the</strong> NLF through defoliation <strong>and</strong> crop
destruction resulted in <strong>the</strong> unintended, although anticipated, consequence of reducing
support from South Vietnamese <strong>the</strong>mselves.
The failure of Ranch H<strong>and</strong> teaches important lessons about <strong>the</strong> challenges inherent in
fighting an air campaign against an insurgency. Targeting <strong>the</strong> infrastructure of insurgencies
is logistically much more difficult than targeting that of conventional forces, since
insurgents require less infrastructure <strong>and</strong> that infrastructure is generally less accessible.
In addition, <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> local population is key for successful counter-insurgency;
campaigns that adversely affect civilians, even inadvertently, can actually hinder <strong>the</strong>
counter-insurgency effort.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 117