Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 5
such as picking up messages <strong>and</strong> dropping mail to various posts. It also mentioned an air
attack near <strong>the</strong> town of Murra: “Six horses were observed around a group of three houses
<strong>and</strong> three men were seen to run into <strong>the</strong> brush. Four bombs were dropped, two making
direct hits on <strong>the</strong> houses.” 175 On 20 April 1928, aircraft bombed <strong>the</strong> area again. A Marine
pilot noted: “The area North <strong>and</strong> North East of Murra were reconnoitred <strong>and</strong> no outlaw
activities were observed. The town of Murra was evidently inhabited as cattle dogs <strong>and</strong>
chickens were present but no people were in sight. Two bombs were dropped <strong>and</strong> a few
shots fired from <strong>the</strong> rear machine gun”. 176
The Marine aviators thus made new <strong>and</strong> important contributions to both <strong>the</strong> actual
campaign <strong>and</strong> military aviation history. Novel techniques <strong>and</strong> tactics were developed
during real combat situations. <strong>Air</strong> power became an integral component of <strong>the</strong> US Marine
small war strategy. The experiences learned in Nicaragua were directly incorporated into
<strong>the</strong> Marines’ Small War Manual.
Problems of Counter-<strong>Insurgency</strong>
Yet, despite <strong>the</strong> contributions of aviation, <strong>the</strong> overall campaign must be classified as a
failure. Marine tactics, both air <strong>and</strong> ground, alienated much of <strong>the</strong> peasant population of
<strong>the</strong> Segovias <strong>and</strong> contributed to an exp<strong>and</strong>ing base of support for S<strong>and</strong>ino. By 1933, when
<strong>the</strong> ceasefire was signed, <strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>inista forces were at <strong>the</strong> pinnacle of <strong>the</strong>ir strength <strong>and</strong>
controlled most of <strong>the</strong> Segovias. The war ended in a military stalemate <strong>and</strong> with a political
victory for S<strong>and</strong>ino, who achieved his goal of forcing all US military forces from Nicaragua.
Marine comm<strong>and</strong>ers emphasised that <strong>the</strong>y were in Nicaragua to protect <strong>the</strong> civilian
population. Their rules of engagement ordered that only enemy soldiers, <strong>the</strong> “b<strong>and</strong>its,” be
engaged in combat. Numerous orders were issued to ensure that <strong>the</strong>se rules were obeyed.
For example, at <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> war, Colonel R H Dunlap, ordered: “When b<strong>and</strong>its
are found in a house, make sure it is <strong>the</strong>ir house before destroying it. … In general, do
not destroy property, stores, or houses except known to belong to b<strong>and</strong>its – to be a b<strong>and</strong>it
hangout.” 177 In ano<strong>the</strong>r memo he added “Of course, every precaution must be taken to
insure that no innocent person is made to suffer.” 178
Marine aviators also insisted that <strong>the</strong>y carried out an “ultra-humane” air attack policy. 179
Major Rowell noted that:
Distinguishing hostile outlaws from innocent citizens is a most
difficult problem. Many outlaw groups doubtless are permitted to
escape attack because of doubtful identification. Exceptional skill
<strong>and</strong> continued experience is relied upon to identify hostile groups.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 89