Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 8
Union against pre-planned targets in Afghanistan, such as <strong>the</strong> Panjshir Valley redoubt
of legendary Mujahideen leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. 316 However, <strong>the</strong> Fencer was still
an aircraft designed for combat over <strong>the</strong> Inner German Border <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> aircraft’s Shryck
MR-1 radar had trouble picking out targets from <strong>the</strong> rocks <strong>and</strong> boulders littering <strong>the</strong>
Afghan terrain. Nap-of-earth flying was also nigh-on impossible because of <strong>the</strong> aircraft’s
manoeuvrability.
Yet Sukhoi had a solution up <strong>the</strong>ir collective sleeve: a close air support aircraft in <strong>the</strong>
tradition of <strong>the</strong> famous Il-2 Shturmovik. The aircraft was <strong>the</strong> Su-25 (“Frogfoot”). If <strong>the</strong>
Hind was <strong>the</strong> signature helicopter, <strong>the</strong> Frogfoot was <strong>the</strong> signature aeroplane. Like <strong>the</strong>
Hind, <strong>the</strong> Frogfoot was at <strong>the</strong> back of <strong>the</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tic queue, but <strong>the</strong> testing of two aircraft in
<strong>the</strong>atre in 1980 gave good results <strong>and</strong> by 1982, two squadrons of <strong>the</strong> aircraft were located
at Shind<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Bagram bringing <strong>the</strong>ir 8,818-lb (4,000-kilogram) payload to bear on <strong>the</strong>
terrified Mujahideen. Eventually, up to 50 Su-25s were deployed inside Afghanistan, <strong>the</strong>y
would perform on average 360 sorties per year per aircraft amassing a collective total of
60,000 sorties with a loss of 21 aircraft in combat. 317 The rebels soon developed a deep
hatred of <strong>the</strong>se aircraft <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y were prized targets for Mujahideen air defenders, yet
destroying a Frogfoot was no easy matter as <strong>the</strong> aircraft were designed to absorb a fair
degree of punishment.
Such aircraft were pressed into service for so-called “air-strike diplomacy” initiatives. For
example, if Soviet prisoners of war were known to be held in a particularly village. Fighter
bombers would perform a strong bombardment of an area within sight of <strong>the</strong> village.
This was followed by a leaflet drop leaving <strong>the</strong> villagers in no doubt that <strong>the</strong>y would soon
receive a similar visit unless <strong>the</strong> prisoners were released. 318
<strong>Air</strong>-l<strong>and</strong> Battle Co-ordination
Co-ordination of <strong>the</strong> air-l<strong>and</strong> battle was something that <strong>the</strong> Soviets excelled in during <strong>the</strong>
war. Avianovodchiki (forward air controllers) ei<strong>the</strong>r mounted in helicopters or vehicles
would co-ordinate <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>ing of airborne troops <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fire support from attack
helicopters. 319 Fighter bombers <strong>and</strong> helicopters would drop <strong>the</strong>ir bombs a minimum of
4,921 ft. (1,500. m) from friendly troops, with rockets falling a minimum of 1,640 ft. (500
m.) <strong>and</strong> 984 ft. (300 m.) for machinegun fire. In practice helicopters would often have <strong>the</strong>ir
bullets falling just yards in front of <strong>the</strong>ir comrades on <strong>the</strong> ground when in close contact
with <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen. 320
However, <strong>the</strong> rebels did protect <strong>the</strong>mselves during air attacks. Networks of communications
trenches were chiselled into mountainsides in which <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen could shelter during
air strikes, before emerging to engage Soviet <strong>and</strong> DRA troops. They also had elaborate
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 135