Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> Counter-insurgency: Back to <strong>the</strong> Basics
The complexity of counter-insurgency strategy has to take into account that insurgency
is local, <strong>and</strong> often driven by local, ra<strong>the</strong>r than national, conditions. This means that,
in addition to a national counter-insurgency strategy, one will likely have to craft
comprehensive local strategies. One can take <strong>the</strong> case of Bangladesh as a current example
of a nation combating local insurgencies. Today <strong>the</strong>re are three small insurgencies in three
different regions of Bangladesh. In organizing to combat <strong>the</strong> insurgencies <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh
government employs essentially <strong>the</strong> Malaya committee model, in which <strong>the</strong> provincial
governor chairs <strong>the</strong> committee that includes <strong>the</strong> senior military, intelligence <strong>and</strong> police
officers as well as <strong>the</strong> civilian directors of <strong>the</strong> social services, economic development <strong>and</strong>
government information service. With <strong>the</strong> civilian governor in charge <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> military
serving in <strong>the</strong> role as support to <strong>the</strong> civilian authorities, each province crafts its own
local strategy to combat <strong>the</strong> insurgents <strong>and</strong> provide security to <strong>the</strong> local population. The
strategy in each province <strong>and</strong> district is likely to be very different. One Bangladeshi officer
explained to me: “In one province <strong>the</strong> strategy is to take a hard line against <strong>the</strong> insurgents,
in ano<strong>the</strong>r province <strong>the</strong>y have taken a soft line <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> third province is somewhere in
<strong>the</strong> middle.” In fact, this is not much different from doing counter-insurgency in Iraq or
Afghanistan. In those countries we have found that we need both national <strong>and</strong> local
strategies, <strong>and</strong> each one has to be comprehensive <strong>and</strong> address <strong>the</strong> social, economic <strong>and</strong>
political dimensions of <strong>the</strong> conflict as well as <strong>the</strong> military side.
Intelligence <strong>and</strong> Counter-insurgency
The role of intelligence in counter-insurgency is fundamentally different from intelligence
in conventional war. Conventional military intelligence is about looking for things you
can see <strong>and</strong> count. Thanks to modern technology, with its signals intelligence, <strong>and</strong>
ability to monitor <strong>the</strong> battlefield by space <strong>and</strong> aerial surveillance, <strong>the</strong> primary mission
of intelligence in conventional war – locating <strong>the</strong> enemy’s main conventional forces
– is relatively easy. The high-tech intelligence assets are featured in conventional war
operations: <strong>the</strong> space, reconnaissance <strong>and</strong> signal assets. In counter-insurgency, <strong>the</strong> first
mission of <strong>the</strong> intelligence agencies is to try to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> conflict. This
means collecting information about <strong>the</strong> whole society, underst<strong>and</strong>ing local conditions,
monitoring public opinion, analyzing social <strong>and</strong> political relationships <strong>and</strong> networks.
And that is just <strong>the</strong> start. The next step is to find <strong>the</strong> insurgent <strong>and</strong> try to underst<strong>and</strong>
his organization. This is difficult because <strong>the</strong> insurgent is likely to wear civilian clo<strong>the</strong>s
<strong>and</strong> hide among <strong>the</strong> population. The insurgents will have a local, perhaps national
organization, <strong>and</strong> it is all underground. If you are lucky, <strong>the</strong> insurgents will st<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>
fight <strong>and</strong> give <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgent <strong>the</strong> chance to use military force <strong>and</strong> air power against
<strong>the</strong>m. Yet even if you decimate <strong>the</strong> insurgent forces, if you do not break <strong>the</strong> underground
support network, <strong>the</strong> insurgent combatant forces will quickly revive.
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”