Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> Counter-insurgency: Back to <strong>the</strong> Basics
gunship <strong>and</strong> a combination of 20-millimetre <strong>and</strong> 40-millimetre automatic cannon make
for an accurate <strong>and</strong> effective firepower combination against ground targets. The primary
advantage of <strong>the</strong> gunship is that it only takes a few weeks to train a competent transport
pilot to be an effective gunship pilot. Conversely, it takes a considerable amount of time
<strong>and</strong> training to get an aeroplane pilot to <strong>the</strong> point where he can accurately drop bombs.
As well as developing <strong>the</strong> A-67 Dragon for counter-insurgency, <strong>the</strong> US <strong>Air</strong>craft
Corporation is currently experimenting with modifying a CASA 212 twin-engine transport
as a gunship. The CASA 212 is a highly popular light transport, easy to maintain <strong>and</strong>
capable of being flown from small rough airfields. In short, <strong>the</strong> CASA is a good choice for
a gunship conversion platform. Given <strong>the</strong> training <strong>and</strong> financing, it would not take long
to equip Afghan <strong>and</strong> Iraqi air forces with effective counter-insurgency aircraft of this type.
One can also see <strong>the</strong> need for such aircraft as <strong>the</strong> A-67 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> CASA 212 is several o<strong>the</strong>r
allied countries facing insurgencies.
It is remarkable that <strong>the</strong>se initiatives to field simple, effective aircraft for counterinsurgency
did not come from <strong>the</strong> US <strong>Air</strong> Force, but from <strong>the</strong> civilian sector. It also
illustrates just how far we have gone in making <strong>the</strong> high-technology war part of our
military culture <strong>and</strong> doctrine. However, one sign of progress is that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Force Special
Operations comm<strong>and</strong> is now very interested <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong>se initiatives. As <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong>power
Annex of <strong>the</strong> US Army <strong>and</strong> Marine Counter-insurgency Manual (FM 3-24 Appendix
E) noted, while <strong>the</strong>re is an important role for high-technology air power in counterinsurgency
operations, <strong>the</strong>re is also an important role for <strong>the</strong> low end of technology.
Conclusions
While <strong>the</strong>re is no air power solution to counter-insurgency, <strong>the</strong>re is certainly a large role
for air power. <strong>Air</strong> power can bring firepower, transport, reconnaissance <strong>and</strong> constant
presence to <strong>the</strong> fight; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>se are all things that <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgency force needs.
Currently, <strong>the</strong> greatest obstacles to doing this mission are not material ones, but what lies
in our own minds <strong>and</strong> our own military cultures. In <strong>the</strong> last sixty years, western nations
have had <strong>the</strong>ir best results in counter-insurgency by first developing a comprehensive
strategy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n remembering that success lies in helping allied nations fight <strong>the</strong>ir own
war. Frankly, <strong>the</strong>re is not a lot of glory in training <strong>and</strong> equipping allied air forces to fight
insurgents. Nor is <strong>the</strong>re much recognition for those who serve as human intelligence
specialist or as a media expert. Yet, in order to fight insurgencies well, we will have to
reorient some of our efforts towards <strong>the</strong>se largely neglected military specialties.
222
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”