Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Unnecessary or Unsung? The Strategic Role of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Britain’s Colonial Counter-Insurgencies
was an acknowledgement on behalf of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Ministry of <strong>the</strong> political implications of air
power if used wantonly. In December 1953 <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Ministry warned <strong>the</strong> Headquarters
of <strong>the</strong> Middle East <strong>Air</strong> Force that: “Use of medium bombers in Mau Mau operations is
political dynamite”. 146 Therefore <strong>the</strong> application of direct offensive air power in Kenya was
minimised, not only for political reasons. We must consider that <strong>the</strong> area of operations in
Kenya was much more constricted than in Malaya, given <strong>the</strong> geographically confined
nature of <strong>the</strong> Mau Mau’s strongholds, as opposed to <strong>the</strong> MRLA’s nationwide presence.
This ensured that any aerial bombardment would have to take place with <strong>the</strong> inevitable
knowledge of <strong>the</strong> civilian community who lived close to <strong>the</strong> insurgent controlled areas,
drastically undermining <strong>the</strong> strategic imperative of harnessing indigenous support for <strong>the</strong>
counter-insurgency campaign.
This raises broader psychological aspects pertaining to <strong>the</strong> use of air power in counterinsurgency,
mainly <strong>the</strong> satisfaction generated within <strong>the</strong> civilian population from merely
seeing aeroplanes in <strong>the</strong> sky which fosters a feeling that something is being done,
whe<strong>the</strong>r or not it is actually having a tangible result on <strong>the</strong> outcome of counter-insurgency
operations. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, despite <strong>the</strong> use of aerial bombardment to herd forest-bound
guerrillas towards awaiting security force patrols, it was estimated that during <strong>the</strong> Kenyan
Emergency it took one tonne of bombs to kill just one insurgent. 147 Yet we must bear in
mind that <strong>the</strong> strategic application of air power in Kenya was narrower than in Malaya. The
stated purpose of air power was “to drive <strong>the</strong> terrorists out of <strong>the</strong> forests … in conjunction
with ground operations.” 148 If we apply this strategic remit to air power, it can be seen as a
relative success, especially given that analysis by <strong>the</strong> security forces in mid-1954 revealed
that a significant proportion of surrendered Mau Mau gave fear of aerial attack as one of
<strong>the</strong> prime factors motivating <strong>the</strong>ir capitulation. 149
In comparison to Malaya, very little secondary literature has actually been written on air
operations in Kenya. Although this is partially underst<strong>and</strong>able given <strong>the</strong> relative paucity
of missions undertaken by <strong>the</strong> RAF in order to quell <strong>the</strong> Mau Mau in contrast to Malaya,
it is surprising that wider analysis has not been forthcoming, especially given <strong>the</strong> logistical
<strong>and</strong> strategic conundrum posed by <strong>the</strong> need to maintain supplies to ground troops in a
confined area of operations without revealing <strong>the</strong>ir position to <strong>the</strong> enemy. In perhaps
<strong>the</strong> only sustained evaluation of <strong>the</strong> Kenyan air campaign, written over thirty years ago,
Alan Waters, a police officer during <strong>the</strong> Mau Mau uprising who later turned to academia,
offers a scathing analysis of both <strong>the</strong> direct <strong>and</strong> indirect use of air power in Kenya. Waters
provides a wi<strong>the</strong>ring critique of aerial bombing of Mau Mau camps in <strong>the</strong> forests, arguing
that it was a “futile <strong>and</strong> counter-productive exercise … (that) gave <strong>the</strong> gangs a feeling
that <strong>the</strong>y were not only very important, but that <strong>the</strong>y were winning every time <strong>the</strong>y
survived.” 150 Yet it was not just direct air power that Waters felt was ineffective. He claims
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”