Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Unnecessary or Unsung? The Strategic Role of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Britain’s Colonial Counter-Insurgencies
operational strength by <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> Emergency. The Far East <strong>Air</strong> Force (FEAF)
had been reduced from seventy squadrons in 1945 to just ten by 1948, totalling just over
100 aircraft. 118 Of <strong>the</strong>se ten squadrons based in <strong>the</strong> Far East, just one squadron, that of
<strong>the</strong> RAF Regiment, Malaya, was in <strong>the</strong> colony at <strong>the</strong> outbreak of <strong>the</strong> Emergency. 119 It
was with <strong>the</strong>se restricted resources that <strong>the</strong> RAF was asked to fulfil a broad strategic role
by <strong>the</strong> Army comm<strong>and</strong>. As envisaged by <strong>the</strong> Director of Operations in Malaya, General
Sir Harold Briggs, in May 1950, <strong>the</strong> RAF would “operate in conjunction with <strong>and</strong> in
support of <strong>the</strong> ground forces. This support may include offensive air strikes (bombing <strong>and</strong>
ground strafing attacks), air supply, visual <strong>and</strong> photographic air reconnaissance, survey
photography <strong>and</strong> inter-communication.” 120 The RAF, aided by its Commonwealth allies in
<strong>the</strong> Royal Malayan <strong>Air</strong> Force (RMAF), <strong>the</strong> Royal Australian <strong>Air</strong> Force (RAAF), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Royal
New Zeal<strong>and</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Force (RNZAF), discharged <strong>the</strong>se strategic imperatives with competence,
but not before <strong>the</strong> utility of air power, as we shall see later, had been called into question
by <strong>the</strong> political masters. By mid-1950 <strong>the</strong> total number of air squadrons stationed in
Malaya had risen to six, totalling 113 aircraft. 121 These squadrons contained a plethora of
aeroplanes, ranging from World War II-era propeller-driven aircraft such as <strong>the</strong> Lincoln
bomber <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spitfire, to newly developed jet aircraft towards <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> conflict,
notably <strong>the</strong> de Havill<strong>and</strong> Vampire <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Canberra jet bomber. A fur<strong>the</strong>r array of rotarywing
aircraft, <strong>and</strong> light <strong>and</strong> medium range transport aeroplanes were also called upon, not
to mention <strong>the</strong> crucial role fulfilled by <strong>the</strong> introduction of helicopters in 1950. In total, 36
different types of aircraft operated during <strong>the</strong> Emergency. 122
“Operation Firedog,” as <strong>the</strong>
air mission in Malaya was known, flew out of six airfields in <strong>the</strong> country, yet operations
centred on RAF Kuala Lumpur.
Overall, given General Briggs’s broad instructions, it can be seen that air power had two
distinct strategic remits: one direct, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r indirect. Direct aerial action placed air power
within <strong>the</strong> primary offensive sphere of military activity, undertaking bombing raids of
known insurgent encampments in <strong>the</strong> jungle, of insurgent food cultivation sites, <strong>and</strong> by
strafing areas of known insurgent activity in order to flush enemy units into <strong>the</strong> path of
a waiting ground troop ambush. Indirect aerial action in Malaya required air power to
fulfil a vital auxiliary role by transporting troops, evacuating injured soldiers, launching
Special Forces parachute drops, undertaking propag<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> psychological operations
over insurgent-controlled or vulnerable areas, dropping supplies to jungle-bound patrols,
<strong>and</strong> conducting visual <strong>and</strong> photographic reconnaissance. The division of <strong>the</strong> RAF’s role
into direct <strong>and</strong> indirect action not only differentiates between <strong>the</strong> limited offensive role
required by <strong>the</strong> former <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> wider yet largely supporting role necessitated by <strong>the</strong> latter,
but also represents a demarcation in <strong>the</strong> qualitative analysis of <strong>the</strong> RAF’s multivariate
mission in Malaya. Direct offensive action by aircraft was responsible for less than ten
percent of all insurgent fatalities during <strong>the</strong> Emergency. 123 This places <strong>the</strong>m responsible
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”