Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 14
frontline troops supported by twelve combat aircraft. 608 Jaguar <strong>and</strong> Mirage F1 combat
aircraft supported by a C-135 FR tanker were stationed in neighbouring Kisangani <strong>and</strong>
Goma, 609 from where <strong>the</strong>y were capable of delivering air cover for ground operations
in Rw<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> of executing low-level flights aimed at deterring combatants. 610 Fur<strong>the</strong>r
major joint interventions throughout <strong>the</strong> 1990s were conducted in Central Africa <strong>and</strong>
in Congo. 611 These operations provided a pool of experience when it came to <strong>the</strong> rapid
deployment to Central Asia. They gave <strong>the</strong> French <strong>Air</strong> Force <strong>the</strong> necessary expertise to
open a new front for air operations over Afghanistan.
Towards <strong>the</strong> Primacy of French Conventional Forces
While <strong>the</strong> French <strong>Air</strong> Force has proved to be extremely skilled in autonomous rapid
interventions, interoperability became a major challenge at <strong>the</strong> outset of <strong>the</strong> post-Cold
War era. Since French decision makers strongly favoured a diplomatic solution <strong>and</strong> were
reluctant to commit forces to an American-led coalition, French forces were only shortly
prior to <strong>the</strong> commencement of Desert Storm integrated into <strong>the</strong> coalition. 612 Yet reluctance
to subordinate French forces to <strong>the</strong> Joint Force Comm<strong>and</strong>er during <strong>the</strong> force build-up led
to a marginalisation of <strong>the</strong> French <strong>Air</strong> Force contingent. 613
Though French aircraft flew 1,237 combat <strong>and</strong> a significant number of tanker <strong>and</strong> airlift
sorties, French participation represented only two percent of <strong>the</strong> total volume of sorties
flown. 614 This was partly due to tight political control. French decision-makers dem<strong>and</strong>ed
to be informed on potential targets forty-eight hours in advance. This proved to be
incompatible with <strong>the</strong> high tempo of air operations. 615
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> reason for this
relatively limited contribution was related to materiel. French aircraft lacked compatible
IFF equipment, which prevented <strong>the</strong>m from working closely with <strong>the</strong> allies, <strong>and</strong> French
Jaguar aircraft, despite <strong>the</strong>ir precision strike capability, lacked night-sight capabilities. 616
In July 1991, an official French report came to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that <strong>the</strong> French <strong>Air</strong> Force
generally was unable to immediately operate in an advanced technological environment. 617
Desert Storm proved at <strong>the</strong> time too big, too technically advanced, <strong>and</strong> too Anglo-Saxon
for <strong>the</strong> French <strong>Air</strong> Force. As such, <strong>the</strong> air campaign constituted a watershed. 618
One French commentator argued that <strong>the</strong> shortfalls envisaged by <strong>the</strong> French <strong>Air</strong> Force
during Desert Storm seriously put into question previous procurement priorities. In
particular, <strong>the</strong> French <strong>Air</strong> Force did not possess sophisticated comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control systems
which proved indispensable for an air campaign of this scale <strong>and</strong> complexity. 619 Shortfalls in
<strong>the</strong> conventional force structure primarily resulted from <strong>the</strong> primacy of nuclear doctrine. 620
As a consequence, substantial parts of <strong>the</strong> French conventional force inventory were
second-rate by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Cold War. 621 Moreover, conventional air force squadrons
were not even allocated enough funds to attain 180 flying hours per pilot per year. 622 The
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 247