Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>’s Role in Asymmetric Operations: The Case of <strong>the</strong> Second Lebanon War
most advanced fighters <strong>and</strong> forced many of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs to evacuate <strong>the</strong> areas south of <strong>the</strong>
Litani River. Use of air power did destroy about half of <strong>the</strong> unused longer-range rockets,
<strong>and</strong> much of Lebanon’s infrastructure, which was used to re-supply Hezbollah. After <strong>the</strong>
war, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah indicated that had he understood <strong>the</strong> degree to
which Israel would retaliate, he may have been more cautious about <strong>the</strong> capture of two
Israeli soldiers in <strong>the</strong> first place, which perhaps suggests that his experiences with <strong>the</strong>
August 2006 conflict will make him more reluctant to push Israel too far in <strong>the</strong> future. 370
In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> IDF may have encountered challenges, but may also have fought
defiantly enough to create a deterrent for future Hezbollah aggression, although this
claim will only be confirmed or refuted over time. While <strong>the</strong> IDF may not have been
correct with its air-l<strong>and</strong>-sea mix, it did demonstrate credible commitment to retaliation,
which could also be seen as an advantage. 371
That said, <strong>the</strong> IDF’s performance <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> after-action analysis were far from auspicious.
As <strong>the</strong> Winograd Report makes clear, <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> war was characterised by “a
strong sense of a crisis <strong>and</strong> deep disappointment with <strong>the</strong> consequences of <strong>the</strong> campaign
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> way it was conducted” <strong>and</strong> an interest in underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>the</strong> past in order to
improve security matters for <strong>the</strong> future. To <strong>the</strong> extent that air power achieved nei<strong>the</strong>r of
Israel’s strategic objectives – <strong>the</strong> two soldiers were not returned alive 372 <strong>and</strong> Hezbollah was
still launching one hundred rockets a day into Israel up until <strong>the</strong> tenuous UN-sponsored
cease-fire 373 – that sense of crisis was justified. As such, it bears serious consideration why
<strong>the</strong> campaign fell short <strong>and</strong> led to <strong>the</strong> disappointment that followed.
The Winograd Report again offers several clues. As <strong>the</strong> report notes in <strong>the</strong> interim
findings, “<strong>the</strong>re was not ano<strong>the</strong>r effective military response to such missile attacks than an
extensive <strong>and</strong> prolonged ground operation to capture <strong>the</strong> areas from which <strong>the</strong> missiles
were fired – which would have a high ‘cost’ … <strong>the</strong>se difficulties were not explicitly raised
with <strong>the</strong> political leaders before <strong>the</strong> decision to strike was taken.” 374
The fundamental reason is that Hezbollah engaged Israel in irregular warfare (IW), 375
or what doctrine refers to as <strong>the</strong> “violent struggle among state <strong>and</strong> non-state actors for
legitimacy <strong>and</strong> influence over <strong>the</strong> relevant populations.” 376 According to <strong>the</strong> US military
doctrine on irregular warfare, irregular warfare includes:
protraction, intertwining military <strong>and</strong> non-military methods,
participation by violent individuals <strong>and</strong> groups that do not
belong to <strong>the</strong> regular armed forces or police of any state <strong>and</strong>
a struggle for control or influence over, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong>
host population … IW extends beyond <strong>the</strong> military domain
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”