Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force Operations in South-West Arabia 1917-1967
This success led to fur<strong>the</strong>r dem<strong>and</strong>s for air support. The Admiralty professed a reluctance
to respond, suggesting that, as an Army operation, it was really a task for l<strong>and</strong>-based
aeroplanes. 74 Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Ben-my-Chree was despatched to Aden in June 1916. 75
This time a total of 845 lbs of high explosive, toge<strong>the</strong>r with incendiaries <strong>and</strong> flechettes
were dropped over a period of four days. Attacks were pressed home from less than 500
feet, <strong>the</strong> maximum height that could be reached, even when flying in <strong>the</strong> coolest part
of <strong>the</strong> day. Many of <strong>the</strong> seaplanes were hit by ground fire although none were brought
down. Once again, <strong>the</strong> opportunity was taken to map <strong>the</strong> Turkish lines <strong>and</strong> to drop
propag<strong>and</strong>a leaflets. 76
Beyond several opportunity attacks carried out during <strong>the</strong> passage of seaplane carriers
between <strong>the</strong> Red Sea <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Indian Ocean, <strong>the</strong> air defence of Aden now fell to <strong>the</strong> Royal
Flying Corps. Limited resources <strong>and</strong> competing dem<strong>and</strong>s meant that <strong>the</strong> first aeroplanes,
a detachment of No 114 Sqn, o<strong>the</strong>rwise based in India, did not arrive until December
1917. Based at Khormaksar, where an airfield was created three miles from Steamer
Point, a variety of elderly Henry Farman <strong>and</strong> BE2 aircraft carried out bomb dropping,
reconnaissance <strong>and</strong> pamphlet dropping for <strong>the</strong> next ten months. Operating under very
difficult conditions, this small unit provided outst<strong>and</strong>ing support to <strong>the</strong> garrison, suffering
several casualties in <strong>the</strong> process. 77
<strong>Air</strong>craft were not decisive in <strong>the</strong> defence of Aden. Their direct military effect was minimal
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y could not bring <strong>the</strong> enemy to battle; any more than <strong>the</strong> ground forces. On <strong>the</strong>
o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>y provided invaluable intelligence on <strong>the</strong> enemy <strong>and</strong> his intentions <strong>and</strong>
greatly bolstered British morale. Perhaps more significantly, <strong>the</strong>y were seen to enhance
British prestige in Arab eyes <strong>and</strong> to offer <strong>the</strong> possibility, assisted by leaflet dropping, of
subverting those still loyal to <strong>the</strong> Ottoman Empire <strong>and</strong> encouraging those prepared to
fight on Britain’s side. In this sense, air power served to reinforce <strong>the</strong> traditional British
approach to colonial warfare ra<strong>the</strong>r than initiating a new strategic approach. 78
I have somewhat laboured over this description of <strong>the</strong> defence of Aden because it seems
to me that it exemplifies <strong>the</strong> key elements of British policy in south-west Arabia: <strong>the</strong> focus
on <strong>the</strong> port of Aden at <strong>the</strong> expense of <strong>the</strong> interior; <strong>the</strong> reliance on <strong>the</strong> influence of local
Arab rulers to maintain order; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> emphasis, if not fixation, on economy of effort as
a strategy in its own right.
<strong>Air</strong> power’s characteristics would prove to be a perfect match to <strong>the</strong>se principles. Moreover,
<strong>the</strong> evident difficulty faced in conducting offensive ground operations – exemplified not
only by <strong>the</strong> fighting at Sheikh Othman but by <strong>the</strong> inability to induce <strong>the</strong> Turkish forces
remaining in <strong>the</strong> Yemen to surrender until March 1919 – was a powerful argument in
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”