Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 4
that <strong>the</strong> “noisy <strong>and</strong> dangerous” nature of air support operations ran <strong>the</strong> risk of revealing
<strong>the</strong> presence of security force incursion into Mau Mau territory. 151 Admittedly, <strong>the</strong> RAF
ran a greater chance of disclosing <strong>the</strong> presence of security force patrols than <strong>the</strong>y did in
Malaya by undertaking supply drops in audible <strong>and</strong> visible proximity of Mau Mau units,
given both <strong>the</strong> smaller area of insurgent activity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> position of insurgent camps
across <strong>the</strong> Aberdare mountain range, affording Mau Mau advantageous positioning to
site <strong>the</strong> location of incoming aerial supply drops. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> accuracy of potential
supplies was hindered by <strong>the</strong> lack of cleared forestry to aim for, whilst <strong>the</strong> entire supply
function was undermined by a shortage of suitable airstrips to launch medium transport
aircraft from. Waters also argues that <strong>the</strong>re was poor communication between <strong>the</strong> security
forces in <strong>the</strong> forest <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> air crews for several reasons. There was a distinct lack of radio
equipment, <strong>the</strong>refore curtailing <strong>the</strong> ability of patrols to call in immediate air support. In
addition, <strong>the</strong> thick foliage made it difficult to accurately pinpoint a target even if a patrol
did manage to find a way around <strong>the</strong> centralised decision-making structure regarding
aerial deployment <strong>and</strong> call in an attack. As Waters states: 152 “Control of air support was a
distant thing <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> police on <strong>the</strong> ground or <strong>the</strong> troops in <strong>the</strong> forest could only suggest
tactical operations far in advance.” Although many of Waters’ criticisms are valid, his
conclusion that <strong>the</strong> only way around such problems as described above is to pass control
of air power in insurgencies from military to civilian h<strong>and</strong>s, is misguided: “It is not enough
for <strong>the</strong> aircraft to be available for <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> local authorities; <strong>the</strong>y must give <strong>the</strong>
local people <strong>the</strong> feeling that <strong>the</strong>y are part of <strong>the</strong> normal structure of society. To do this
<strong>the</strong> aircraft must belong to <strong>the</strong> civil authority, that is, <strong>the</strong> police.” 153 Not only would this
provoke serious questions of accountability, but would require a significant reappraisal of
civil-military relations. The inadequacies <strong>and</strong> frustrations of air power in Kenya were not
down to RAF incompetence, but were a result of <strong>the</strong> confined area of counter-insurgent
operations <strong>and</strong> a continued concentration of RAF resources elsewhere in <strong>the</strong> Middle <strong>and</strong>
Far East. After all, <strong>the</strong> RAF could not be held responsible for <strong>the</strong> pervading belief among
<strong>the</strong> civilian <strong>and</strong> military leaders that <strong>the</strong> atavistic Mau Mau would be easily defeated on
<strong>the</strong> ground. As in Malaya, direct air power was unable to achieve any substantial success
or alter <strong>the</strong> fundamental nature of <strong>the</strong> campaign. However, what is significant is that <strong>the</strong>
nature of <strong>the</strong> conflict in Kenya, as opposed to Malaya, in terms of its size <strong>and</strong> urgency,
ensured that even indirect air power was marginalised. Although an aerial presence
comprises a component of most counter-insurgency operations, it is by no means assured
that air power will play a fundamental supporting role, as in Malaya, or will be sidelined
due to operational circumstance, as in Kenya. What is certain, though, is that air power,
whe<strong>the</strong>r marginalised or not, still needs to be retained as an essential weapon in <strong>the</strong>
counter-insurgency arsenal given its inherent tactical flexibility <strong>and</strong> ability to contribute
to <strong>the</strong> fulfilment of <strong>the</strong> overarching strategic imperatives.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 77