Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 5
political mission … dictates <strong>the</strong> military strategy”. 197 The Manual <strong>the</strong>n stated: “Every
endeavor should be made to assure <strong>the</strong> civilian population of <strong>the</strong> friendliness of our
forces.” 198 Following this line of reasoning, as Wray Johnson notes, “it is not surprising that
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps would acquiesce to <strong>the</strong> need for restraint – including <strong>the</strong> application
of airpower.” 199
However, in <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan campaign military doctrine did not match <strong>the</strong> reality of
<strong>the</strong> war. All <strong>the</strong> orders, reports <strong>and</strong> studies could not resolve <strong>the</strong> basic dilemma for <strong>the</strong>
Marines actually in combat, which was identifying <strong>the</strong> enemy. As soldiers had done before
<strong>and</strong> after, <strong>the</strong> Marines decided that, since <strong>the</strong>y could not distinguish friends from foes,
all were potential enemies. Thus, despite <strong>the</strong> orders for restraint, almost everyone <strong>and</strong>
everything were open to attack. The written reports described all <strong>the</strong>ir actions against
“known b<strong>and</strong>its”.
For <strong>the</strong> Marine aviators this identification problem was especially difficult. Even with <strong>the</strong>
best intentions, unless <strong>the</strong>y were under fire, <strong>the</strong>y had no way of differentiating <strong>the</strong> peasants
from <strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>inista combatants. They relied on <strong>the</strong> very faulty ground intelligence to
determine who <strong>the</strong> enemy was. To make <strong>the</strong> situation more complicated, as previously
noted, <strong>the</strong> peaceful-looking peasants of <strong>the</strong> day might <strong>the</strong>mselves be <strong>the</strong> guerrillas of
<strong>the</strong> night.
By <strong>the</strong> very nature of <strong>the</strong> technology, an air war physically distances <strong>the</strong> attacker from <strong>the</strong>
attacked. While by today’s st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>the</strong> Marines’ aeroplanes were slow <strong>and</strong> low-flying,
<strong>the</strong>y still separated <strong>the</strong> aviators from <strong>the</strong>ir targets on <strong>the</strong> ground. Marine pilots were based
in <strong>the</strong> towns where <strong>the</strong> airfields were constructed <strong>and</strong> had almost no contact with <strong>the</strong>
rural population except while on air patrol. Almost every activity on <strong>the</strong> ground might be
defined as “suspicious” to <strong>the</strong> aviators.
Beyond <strong>the</strong> identification problems, US policy-makers made ano<strong>the</strong>r essential error. They
had defined S<strong>and</strong>ino as a b<strong>and</strong>it <strong>and</strong> thus denied <strong>the</strong> fundamental political nature of
<strong>the</strong> insurgency. The Marines faced a conundrum of <strong>the</strong>ir own making: that <strong>the</strong>ir very
presence was <strong>the</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> uprising which <strong>the</strong>y were trying to defeat. S<strong>and</strong>ino was
never a b<strong>and</strong>it, but was always a nationalist. S<strong>and</strong>ino wanted nothing less than <strong>the</strong> total
withdrawal of US forces. Thus, unless he could be defeated on <strong>the</strong> battlefield <strong>the</strong>re was no
way for <strong>the</strong> US to win <strong>the</strong> war.
While S<strong>and</strong>ino might be considered <strong>the</strong> victor of <strong>the</strong> war, he did lose <strong>the</strong> peace. When <strong>the</strong>
Marines departed Nicaragua <strong>the</strong>y left in place <strong>the</strong> Guardia Nacional, now under Nicaraguan
comm<strong>and</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> negotiations that continued after <strong>the</strong> ceasefire, S<strong>and</strong>ino dem<strong>and</strong>ed that
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 95