Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Notes <strong>and</strong> Resources
230. Quoted in Smith, Victory of a Sort, p. 220.
231. Ibid.
232. The records for <strong>the</strong> Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), formerly ELAS, are held by
<strong>the</strong> Greek Communist Party (KKE) <strong>and</strong> are closed to <strong>the</strong> public. However, <strong>the</strong> KKE
has reprinted all 21 issues of <strong>the</strong> DSE’s journal, Democratic Army. An article
published in April 1948 describes this transition from a guerrilla force into a
regular army. See Democratic Army, April 1948, pp. 107-112.
233. For <strong>the</strong> best discussion of British influence in Greek doctrinal development, see
Tim Jones, “The British Army, <strong>and</strong> Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1945-49,”
Small Wars <strong>and</strong> Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 88-106. See also:
M Campbell, E Downs <strong>and</strong> L Schuetta, The Employment of <strong>Air</strong>power in <strong>the</strong> Greek
Guerrilla War, 1947-1949 (Concepts Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, <strong>Air</strong>
University, Maxwell AFB, 1964), pp. 62-63; National Archives, AIR 46/62. “Report
on Anti-B<strong>and</strong>it Operations,” 15 May 1947; WO 202/951. “Report 38, Period 21 Nov
1948-20 Feb 1949”.
234. <strong>Air</strong> Historical Branch (RAF), Report by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Allied Comm<strong>and</strong>er Mediterranean
to <strong>the</strong> Combined Chiefs of Staff: Greece, 1944-1945 (London, HMSO, 1949), p. 10.
235. General Charles Krulak, former Comm<strong>and</strong>ant US Marine Corps, articulated a
notion of “3 Block War,” whereby friendly forces would be faced with high-end
warfighting <strong>and</strong> “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds” activity, <strong>and</strong> everything else in between, all
within <strong>the</strong> space of three urban blocks.
236. For example, Seymour M Hersh, Chemical <strong>and</strong> Biological Warfare: America’s
Hidden Arsenal (London, 1968). J B Neil<strong>and</strong>s, Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare
in Vietnam <strong>and</strong> Cambodia (New York, 1972). I will use <strong>the</strong> term “defoliant” throughout
this chapter, since <strong>the</strong> Kennedy administration often used “defoliant” instead of
“herbicide” when discussing this initiative, particularly in <strong>the</strong> programme’s early
stages. However, <strong>the</strong> chemicals used in South Vietnam often acted as de facto
herbicides, regardless of how <strong>the</strong>y were intended, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> crop interdiction was
generally premised on killing ra<strong>the</strong>r than defoliating. Using <strong>the</strong> less-loaded term
does not change <strong>the</strong> conclusions of <strong>the</strong> chapter. In fact, considering <strong>the</strong> chemicals
as herbicides makes <strong>the</strong>ir disadvantages even more marked <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> failure of
Ranch H<strong>and</strong> even more striking.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 275