Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Starting with a Blank Sheet: Principles of War for a New Century
do so on US territory; a concern we have seldom worried about in generations past. It is
also indicative of our times that a major office within Homel<strong>and</strong> Security deals with civil
rights <strong>and</strong> legal issues to ensure <strong>the</strong> rights of Americans <strong>and</strong> foreign visitors are protected.
I would also note that for <strong>the</strong> US <strong>Air</strong> Force this new threat has resurrected an old weapon
of defence. For decades during <strong>the</strong> Cold War <strong>the</strong> USAF had an <strong>Air</strong> Defense Comm<strong>and</strong>
consisting of over two thous<strong>and</strong> interceptor aircraft designed to meet a Soviet bomber
attack. Over time this force dwindled to a few squadrons. It is now re-established in a
smaller form to protect against fur<strong>the</strong>r 9/11-type airliner attacks by terrorists.
3. Unity of Comm<strong>and</strong>. This is an old concept, but when <strong>the</strong> term was used in <strong>the</strong> past it
generally was concerned with unity of comm<strong>and</strong> over similar forces in a given <strong>the</strong>atre.
In World War I, for example, it was used as an argument for appointing a single Allied
comm<strong>and</strong>er on <strong>the</strong> Western Front, one who would have control over all ground forces,
whe<strong>the</strong>r belonging to <strong>the</strong> British, French or US. Too often in coalition warfare in <strong>the</strong> past,
comm<strong>and</strong>ers of national contingents were more responsive to politics <strong>and</strong> politicians in
<strong>the</strong>ir home capitals than <strong>the</strong>y were to <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> coalition as it confronted an enemy.
The various coalitions that fought Napoleon, for example, were initially unsuccessful
for this very reason: <strong>the</strong> differing, parochial concerns of Austria, Prussia, Russia <strong>and</strong>
Engl<strong>and</strong> were such that a unified front was never able to present itself for very long
against Napoleon. For two decades <strong>the</strong> Emperor played upon <strong>the</strong>se divisions, splitting <strong>the</strong>
coalition <strong>and</strong> defeating its constituent members piecemeal. It was only during <strong>the</strong> final
gr<strong>and</strong> coalition of 1814-15 that Europe united against France, appointed a single field
comm<strong>and</strong>er (<strong>the</strong> Austrian Prince Karl Philip Schwarzenberg), <strong>and</strong> temporarily put <strong>the</strong>ir
individual concerns aside to defeat <strong>the</strong> common foe. 477 The epitome of this new attitude
was at Waterloo when <strong>the</strong> seemingly-defeated Prussian Marshal Gebhard von Blücher
returned to <strong>the</strong> battlefield to combine with Wellington’s forces to defeat <strong>the</strong> French; an
event that Napoleon did not expect simply because such a spirit of unity against him had
not existed before.
The dem<strong>and</strong>s of <strong>the</strong>atre-wide warfare necessitate unity of comm<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> this fact is due
to <strong>the</strong> increasingly long ranges <strong>and</strong> responsiveness of <strong>the</strong> weapons at a comm<strong>and</strong>er’s
disposal. <strong>Air</strong>craft can travel hundreds of miles in minutes to deliver ordnance, <strong>and</strong> space
assets can direct <strong>the</strong>ir sensors on entire <strong>the</strong>atres during a single pass. When such systems
can see or shoot at continental distances, <strong>the</strong>re must be a guiding h<strong>and</strong> to ensure those
systems are operating in a co-ordinated <strong>and</strong> seamless fashion to achieve a specific purpose.
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s of today’s increasing move towards jointness <strong>and</strong> integration,
discussed below, require that <strong>the</strong> principle of unity of comm<strong>and</strong> be taken to a new level.
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”