Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> Profession: Adaptions to Continuity <strong>and</strong> Change in <strong>the</strong> Strategic Environment
is typical of those who claim that operational innovation “is inevitably reduced by doctrine
because doctrine explicitly teaches <strong>the</strong> nature of operations to be of a particular kind <strong>and</strong>
not ano<strong>the</strong>r”. O<strong>the</strong>rs challenge <strong>the</strong> notions that professional knowledge is cumulative,
suggesting instead that paradigm shifts can occur that call into question <strong>the</strong> utility of
“traditional” assumptions about strategy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> capabilities in <strong>the</strong> inventories of modern
state-of-<strong>the</strong>-art air forces. Indeed, it could be said that air power as a concept came into
being as a result of just such a paradigm shift. There is general recognition that <strong>the</strong> socalled
“revolution in military affairs,” which marries intelligence systems with precision
strikes, now provides technologically-capable western armed forces with a decisive edge
in symmetrical state-on-state forms of warfare. Correspondingly, some critics argue <strong>the</strong>
so-called “revolution in political affairs” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> prevalence of “4th Generation” nonstate
actors present asymmetric threats against which high-technology <strong>and</strong> precision
are ill-suited, suggesting that armed forces now lack <strong>the</strong> conceptual tools <strong>and</strong> physical
capabilities required to defeat <strong>the</strong> insurgencies making up <strong>the</strong> Global War on Terror. 25
O<strong>the</strong>r areas of concern are <strong>the</strong> practical difficulties encountered in employing military
force as part of a coherent inter-agency “comprehensive approach” against insurgents
employing asymmetric strategies. Here, critics have pointed to inter-agency frictions,
competition <strong>and</strong> misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing as key impediments to <strong>the</strong> achievement of <strong>the</strong>
political, operational <strong>and</strong> tactical requirements of COIN operations. 26 Finally, air forces
<strong>and</strong> national militaries as a whole are criticised for failing to invest physical <strong>and</strong> intellectual
resources into COIN campaign requirements. Some, for example, claim that acquisition
<strong>and</strong> retention of highly capable offensive air capabilities reflect organisational vested
interest in expensive <strong>and</strong> inappropriate high-technology platforms ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> needs
of contemporary COIN operations. This reflects a concern that, since 1945, insurgencies
have been more widespread than conventional wars 27 but most air forces remain primarily
organised, trained, educated <strong>and</strong> equipped to fight conventional war.
The specific attributes of COIN present particular challenges for air power practitioners
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> military profession as a whole. Whichever “national principles” are adopted as
a framework for COIN operations, <strong>the</strong>y all point to conceptual, practical, inter-agency
<strong>and</strong> institutional complexities when compared to symmetrical forms of warfare. These
complexities arise from <strong>the</strong> political nature of insurgencies, <strong>the</strong> unique challenges
in creating co-ordinated government counter-insurgency machinery, difficulties in
generating intelligence, identifying appropriate mechanisms to separate insurgents
from <strong>the</strong> “people,” <strong>and</strong> issues of proportionality when <strong>the</strong> military instrument of state
policy is applied.
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”