Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Techniques <strong>and</strong> Gadgets, Hearts <strong>and</strong> Minds: An Analysis of Operation Ranch H<strong>and</strong>
<strong>and</strong> Research, wrote in his memoir that <strong>the</strong> Defense Department overrode <strong>the</strong> State
Department’s concerns about unintended consequences.
The State Department view … was that <strong>the</strong> political repercussions
would outweigh any possible gains. Defoliation was just too
reminiscent of gas warfare. It would cost us international support
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Viet Cong would use it to good propag<strong>and</strong>a advantage as an
example of <strong>the</strong> Americans making war on <strong>the</strong> peasants. 263
Kennedy made <strong>the</strong> decision that <strong>the</strong> strategic benefits of defoliation would outweigh any
political <strong>and</strong> symbolic problems.
The White House counted on Diệm to inoculate <strong>the</strong>m from adverse publicity by aiding
those civilians affected by chemical spraying. What <strong>the</strong> administration did not fully
appreciate was <strong>the</strong> divergence between <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> Diệm government <strong>and</strong> those
of <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese <strong>the</strong>mselves. Some senior officials suspected even before <strong>the</strong> food
interdiction campaign that Diệm would not do his part to ensure <strong>the</strong> safety of South
Vietnamese citizens, insofar as that was possible. “[Food denial] should begin only after
development of a careful program of resettling <strong>the</strong> innocent populations of <strong>the</strong> areas <strong>and</strong>
assurance that <strong>the</strong>y have adequate replacement food supplies. So far as we can tell, Diem
has no such plans now developed”. 264
The State Department, however, suggested that
<strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese government take <strong>the</strong> lead in resettlement <strong>and</strong> food distribution. 265
Relying on Diệm to protect <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese from Ranch H<strong>and</strong> proved a mistake. As
late as April 1963, <strong>the</strong> State Department feared that “our use of defoliant chemicals may
have been premature,” because <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese <strong>the</strong>mselves were likely bearing <strong>the</strong>
impact. 266 The Diệm government’s plans for resettlement <strong>and</strong> food distribution, such as
<strong>the</strong>y were, did not prevent <strong>the</strong> crop destruction efforts from alienating <strong>the</strong> very people
<strong>the</strong> US needed as allies. A 1967 study by <strong>the</strong> RAND Corporation estimated that 325,000
South Vietnamese experienced crop damage as a result of chemical sprayings. Through
interviews, RAND determined that 88 percent of villagers interviewed “blamed <strong>the</strong> US/
GVN for <strong>the</strong> destruction of <strong>the</strong>ir crops <strong>and</strong> 74 percent expressed outright hatred.” 267
Opposition to <strong>the</strong> use of defoliants <strong>and</strong> herbicides was not limited to South Vietnam.
Religious leaders in <strong>the</strong> US took out ads in <strong>the</strong> New York Times to protest <strong>the</strong> administration’s
“immoral spraying.” 268 Organised US protests against <strong>the</strong> use of chemicals in Vietnam
were widespread by 1966, when a group of 29 scientists signed a statement directed to
President Lyndon Johnson. The statement condemned <strong>the</strong> use of chemicals in Vietnam
as barbarous, calling <strong>the</strong>m “an attack on <strong>the</strong> entire population.” 269 With that statement,
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”