Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> Counter-insurgency: Back to <strong>the</strong> Basics
Because aerial attack is automatically viewed in <strong>the</strong> less developed world as cruel <strong>and</strong>
heavy-h<strong>and</strong>ed, it creates a paradox for policymakers. While air power is often <strong>the</strong> most
effective means to strike at insurgents <strong>and</strong> terrorists, its use will provoke outcry in many
quarters of western society <strong>and</strong> throughout <strong>the</strong> less developed world. In short, <strong>the</strong>re is a
heavy political price to pay when air power in <strong>the</strong> form of air strikes is used.
The US <strong>and</strong> western nations must do much better in presenting our side of <strong>the</strong> conflict to
<strong>the</strong> world media. We have to be ready to counter a large scale disinformation campaign
mounted by insurgent <strong>and</strong> radical groups against our military operations. A senior
comm<strong>and</strong>er today, operating against irregular enemies, needs a highly trained specialist
cadre who can h<strong>and</strong>le media <strong>and</strong> information operations. 507
The poor Israeli response to
<strong>the</strong> conflict with Hezbollah in sou<strong>the</strong>rn Lebanon in <strong>the</strong> summer of 2006 ought to be a
warning about <strong>the</strong> need to anticipate <strong>the</strong> opponent’s media campaign <strong>and</strong> to proactively
develop responses using <strong>the</strong>mes, words <strong>and</strong> images that will appeal not only to our own
public, usually <strong>the</strong> audience for our own media campaigns, but also to <strong>the</strong> people of <strong>the</strong>
region. When we catch our opponents using lies <strong>and</strong> disinformation, or <strong>the</strong> western media
uncritically repeating <strong>the</strong> disinformation, we need to be able to quickly <strong>and</strong> effectively
counter such propag<strong>and</strong>a campaigns. Counter-insurgency is still about winning hearts
<strong>and</strong> minds, <strong>and</strong> effective media operations are one of <strong>the</strong> main weapons we have. As
<strong>the</strong> US Army <strong>and</strong> Marine Corps counter-insurgency doctrine argues: “Some of <strong>the</strong> best
weapons for <strong>the</strong> counter-insurgent do not shoot.” 508
Ano<strong>the</strong>r thing that we should seriously consider is directly confronting <strong>the</strong> insurgent
tactics of using civilians as human shields as <strong>the</strong>ir means of inhibiting our air power <strong>and</strong>
also gaining propag<strong>and</strong>a advantages by increasing <strong>the</strong> likelihood of civilian casualties.
One important step to deter this practice would be to aggressively prosecute leaders of
radical <strong>and</strong> insurgent groups as war criminals when <strong>the</strong>y use civilians as human shields.
The precedent of <strong>the</strong> Nuremberg Trials is clear: leaders can be held responsible for <strong>the</strong>
systematic policy of war crimes committed by <strong>the</strong>ir subordinates. There is ample hard
evidence that this is a common practice, <strong>and</strong> indicting <strong>and</strong> prosecuting insurgent leaders
for such acts will serve to change <strong>the</strong> legal <strong>and</strong> political dynamics in which insurgency <strong>and</strong>
terrorism are viewed.
The Doctrinal Gaps
The current conflicts that we are facing in Iraq <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan are forcing us, however
reluctantly, to re-evaluate air power <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>and</strong> doctrines. For many years, <strong>the</strong> study
of air power against non-state enemies was largely ignored by mainstream air force
officers <strong>and</strong> generally relegated to <strong>the</strong> Special Forces. Our air power doctrine reflected
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”