Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 10
The interaction between those who supported <strong>the</strong> concept of bombing civilian targets
<strong>and</strong> those who opposed it provides an insight into <strong>the</strong> major arguments over <strong>the</strong> ethics of
air power. The Government, <strong>the</strong> churches, <strong>the</strong> public <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> RAF were involved in this
discourse. It now helps us to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ethical <strong>and</strong> strategic calculus of <strong>the</strong> “o<strong>the</strong>r,”
specifically GSJ movements.
The Inter-war Years
The effectiveness of air power in support of o<strong>the</strong>r forces was demonstrated in World War
I <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> years following <strong>the</strong> Great War allowed people to reflect imaginatively on its
potential as a force with unique capabilities. A Cabinet Office paper produced by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong>
Ministry encapsulated <strong>the</strong> situation at <strong>the</strong> time:
Great as was <strong>the</strong> development of air power in <strong>the</strong> war on <strong>the</strong>
Western front, it was mainly concerned with aerial action against
enemy aircraft <strong>and</strong> co-operation with o<strong>the</strong>r arms in actions in which
l<strong>and</strong> or sea forces were <strong>the</strong> predominant partner. In more distant
<strong>the</strong>atres, however, such as Palestine, Mesopotamia <strong>and</strong> East Africa
<strong>the</strong> war has proved that <strong>the</strong> air has capabilities of its own. 403
Of <strong>the</strong>se new <strong>the</strong>atres of self-expression for air power, Mesopotamia was perhaps <strong>the</strong>
most influential. Through <strong>Air</strong> Control <strong>the</strong> RAF became <strong>the</strong> primary instrument of British
foreign policy in <strong>the</strong> Middle East <strong>and</strong> took over <strong>the</strong> commission in Iraq in October 1922,
deploying eight squadrons of fighters <strong>and</strong> light bombers, four armoured car units <strong>and</strong>
several thous<strong>and</strong> Iraqi Levies. Operations occurred against Turkish <strong>and</strong> Najdi raiders into
Iraqi as well as Kurdish <strong>and</strong> Arab rebellions within <strong>the</strong> country itself.
The air control strategy was based on <strong>the</strong> concept of “moral effect” which depended on
<strong>the</strong> ubiquity of air power <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Bedouin would “behave” because <strong>the</strong>y
could not discriminate between “bombing <strong>and</strong> reconnaissance expeditions”. When tribes
misbehaved <strong>and</strong> needed a lesson, “airpower was a useful tool. An aerial raid with bombs
<strong>and</strong> machine guns often has an overwhelming <strong>and</strong> sometimes an instantaneous effect in
inducing submission”. 404 To achieve <strong>the</strong> “moral effect,” Charles Townshend points out that
it needed to be “cemented at <strong>the</strong> outset by exemplary violence - in fact, terror.” This could
only be achieved with <strong>the</strong> loss of life, as <strong>the</strong> RAF <strong>the</strong>n accepted in statements. 405 In simple
terms this meant that entire villages were bombed as a punishment for rebellion or for
refusal to pay taxes <strong>and</strong> as an example to o<strong>the</strong>rs.
These practical consequences did not go un-criticised by Whitehall senior officials. The <strong>Air</strong>
Ministry responded to criticisms by issuing a series of papers on <strong>the</strong> effects of bombing
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 163