Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 7
12 April 1961, advocating “gearing up” US efforts in Vietnam using an assortment of
“techniques <strong>and</strong> gadgets.” 241 American officers had already begun thinking conceptually
about defoliants <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir use in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Asia. The l<strong>and</strong> area of Vietnam was eighty
percent covered in vegetation, of which more than half was jungle. 242 Defoliants were one
of <strong>the</strong> main areas of development at <strong>the</strong> joint US – South Vietnam combat development
<strong>and</strong> test centre, which started in June 1961. 243 By July, drums of defoliant were on <strong>the</strong>ir
way to Vietnam. 244
The administration intended Ranch H<strong>and</strong> to serve several purposes. The first goal of
Ranch H<strong>and</strong> was to prevent or at least to disrupt <strong>the</strong> NLF’s movement <strong>and</strong> activity
through <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn forests by reducing <strong>the</strong> amount of cover <strong>the</strong> forests provided.
Defoliants would, <strong>the</strong> administration believed, expose hidden NLF infiltration routes <strong>and</strong>
positions by denuding <strong>the</strong> forests <strong>and</strong> jungles of South Vietnam. Ambitions for Ranch
H<strong>and</strong> included “defoliating a portion of <strong>the</strong> Mekong Delta ... Destroying mangrove
swamps” in order to deprive NLF insurgents of “protective cover.” 245
The second goal of <strong>the</strong> operation was to impose sanctions on <strong>the</strong> NLF by denying <strong>the</strong>m
<strong>the</strong> local food supplies <strong>the</strong>y had been using to carry on <strong>the</strong> war in <strong>the</strong> South. Even before
Kennedy had officially approved <strong>the</strong> programme, <strong>the</strong> State Department was explicitly
calling for “manioc (tapioca) killer” to be delivered to <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese <strong>Air</strong> Force. 246
South Vietnamese President Ngô-Dình Diệm advocated striking NLF “manioc, corn, sweet
potato, rice, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r crops.” 247 The administration viewed crop destruction as a type of
sanction against NLF forces in <strong>the</strong> South; “an effective [crop destruction] program might
be able to cut down food supplies enough to prevent <strong>the</strong> Viet Cong from stockpiling, thus
making it difficult for <strong>the</strong>m to concentrate large forces <strong>and</strong> sustain <strong>the</strong>m in combat.” 248 An
embassy telegram to Rusk outlined goals for crop destruction in <strong>the</strong> fall of 1962. “Crops
of course VC grown <strong>and</strong> VC consumed <strong>and</strong>, depending on amount of acreage destroyed,
<strong>the</strong>ir denial would have important adverse effect on VC in area.” 249
Chemicals were also attractive because <strong>the</strong>ir use would allow both <strong>the</strong> US <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> South
Vietnamese to conserve manpower. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said Vietnam “can be
critical <strong>and</strong> we would like to throw in resources ra<strong>the</strong>r than people if we can,” noted <strong>the</strong>
Director of <strong>the</strong> Bureau of <strong>the</strong> Budget .250 With so many potential foreign policy crises, <strong>the</strong>
administration could ill afford to spend profligately on any one of <strong>the</strong>m. Defoliation could
be a relatively cost-effective way to cut off <strong>the</strong> insurgents’ movement <strong>and</strong> supplies without
tying down troops or American advisors.
Not everyone in <strong>the</strong> administration was so sanguine about <strong>the</strong> usefulness of defoliants.
Some saw <strong>the</strong> ineptitude <strong>and</strong> corruption of <strong>the</strong> Diệm regime as <strong>the</strong> biggest obstacle to US
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 119