Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
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Chapter 11<br />
not internati<strong>on</strong>al, c<strong>on</strong>cerns: that he was merely trying to distract attenti<strong>on</strong> from <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
C<strong>on</strong>gressi<strong>on</strong>al hearings into <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> M<strong>on</strong>ica Lewinsky sc<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>al that were scheduled for <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
following day. In 2003, President George Bush, after c<strong>on</strong>sulting C<strong>on</strong>gress <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> obtaining<br />
its approval via a voted resoluti<strong>on</strong>, launched an invasi<strong>on</strong> of Iraq. His stated political<br />
purposes were to c<strong>on</strong>fiscate or destroy Iraq’s illegally-held weap<strong>on</strong>s of mass destructi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
overthrow <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> oppressive <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> n<strong>on</strong>-elected regime of Saddam Hussein (<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> initiate a<br />
wave of democratic reform throughout <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> regi<strong>on</strong>), <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> ensure that all elements of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
al Qaeda terrorist group operating or hiding in Iraq were exposed <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> neutralised.<br />
The comm<strong>on</strong> element in <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>se five diverse examples of military acti<strong>on</strong> is that all were<br />
instigated by political leaders for, what were claimed, sound <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> specific political purposes.<br />
If all of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>se cases fulfil <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> dictates of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> noti<strong>on</strong> that <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of military force must<br />
c<strong>on</strong>form to a principle of war that dem<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>s a political/policy purpose rati<strong>on</strong>alizing such<br />
use, than that principle is manifestly meaningless.<br />
Ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r, many will no doubt fall back <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> argument that <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> principle of political<br />
purpose must necessarily be qualified. That is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> political purpose used as justificati<strong>on</strong><br />
for military acti<strong>on</strong> should be rati<strong>on</strong>al, c<strong>on</strong>sensual, achievable <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> moral. Yet motives are<br />
virtually always judged through <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> eyes of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> beholder, or more to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> point, by those<br />
devising <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> political purposes for military acti<strong>on</strong>. Even <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> acti<strong>on</strong>s of Hitler, Stalin <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Tojo were justified in <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir own eyes, but were not seen as being so by a large porti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> globe. A bit more surprisingly perhaps is that nei<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r were <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> acti<strong>on</strong>s of Presidents<br />
Clint<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Bush viewed by many as fulfilling <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> criteria. Yet in all five cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> majority<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> populati<strong>on</strong>s (<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> militaries) of Germany, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>, Japan <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> US<br />
supported <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> acti<strong>on</strong>s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> by extensi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> political purposes, of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir leaders. At least<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>y did so as l<strong>on</strong>g as <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> military operati<strong>on</strong>s were viewed as being successful.<br />
It <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>refore seems clear that merely stating a principle of war that all military acti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
must have a purpose <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> that such purpose must be grounded in policy/politics can be<br />
an extremely vague if not misleading c<strong>on</strong>cept. N<strong>on</strong>e<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>less, it is equally self-evident that<br />
Purpose is indeed a crucial comp<strong>on</strong>ent of military acti<strong>on</strong>. Yes, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>re must be a point to it<br />
all. Given <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> l<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>mines surrounding such a principle, however, perhaps it merely can be<br />
said that <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>se purposes should be well-c<strong>on</strong>ceived, clear, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> n<strong>on</strong>-trivial, that <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of<br />
military force should not be c<strong>on</strong>sidered as an end in itself, that <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> gains to be achieved<br />
should be commensurate to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> resources expended, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> that all those involved should<br />
underst<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> what is expected of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>m individually <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a nati<strong>on</strong> before employing <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
military tool. Yet saying that says a very great deal indeed.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Power</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Insurgency</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> “War <strong>on</strong> Terror” 205