Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force Operations in South-West Arabia 1917-1967
When <strong>the</strong> culprit is a Treaty Chief, it is important that action
taken against him should, if possible, avoid a breech between <strong>the</strong>
Government <strong>and</strong> his tribe as a whole.
These requirements had, in reality, underpinned <strong>the</strong> air control regime since 1928. What
was new, however, was <strong>the</strong> willingness of <strong>the</strong> Colonial Office to formalise <strong>the</strong> process.
It also presaged a determination by Whitehall to decide, not just how air control should
function, but where <strong>and</strong> when air action should be taken. This perhaps more than anything
marked a turning point in <strong>the</strong> history of air control in south-west Arabia.
The Aftermath of War
The immediate post-war period (1945-1951) has been described in <strong>the</strong> Official History
as <strong>the</strong> “quiet years”. 104 In one sense this is true, particularly with an eye on what was <strong>the</strong>
follow. In ano<strong>the</strong>r sense it is misleading. <strong>Air</strong> attacks against rebellious tribesmen were
carried out on at least sixteen occasions between 1946 <strong>and</strong> 1952. These involved higherperformance
aircraft, in <strong>the</strong> form of Mosquitoes <strong>and</strong> Tempests, <strong>and</strong> new weapons such
as rockets <strong>and</strong> cannon. There was also a determination to use air power more freely than
before, driven partly by a belief that lawlessness in <strong>the</strong> Protectorates had prospered during
<strong>the</strong> wartime years.
In 1947, for example, action was again taken against <strong>the</strong> Quteibis, who were again raiding
caravans on <strong>the</strong> main trade routes, oblivious of <strong>the</strong>ir submission in 1934. The intention
was to impose <strong>the</strong> maximum moral effect combined with <strong>the</strong> maximum material effect.
After <strong>the</strong> traditional ultimatum had expired, <strong>and</strong> following both a 48-hour <strong>and</strong> 24-hour
warning, bombing operations commenced on 27 November 1947 employing six Lincolns
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tempests of No 8 Squadron. The latter attacked villages <strong>and</strong> armed forts with
bombs <strong>and</strong> rockets while <strong>the</strong> Lincolns dropped single 1,000 lb bombs on specified targets
in <strong>the</strong> adjacent Wadis. Over <strong>the</strong> next few days nearly seventy tons of bombs were dropped
<strong>and</strong> some 250 60lb HE rockets fired. Although considerable damage was done to <strong>the</strong>
tribe’s villages, <strong>and</strong> a number of forts were totally destroyed, no lives were lost <strong>and</strong>, after
a pause for renewed negotiations, <strong>the</strong> Quteibis duly submitted. In comparison with <strong>the</strong>
1934 operations, <strong>the</strong> RAF had achieved success in just three days ra<strong>the</strong>r than 61 days,
while dropping much <strong>the</strong> same tonnage of bombs (although admittedly this was achieved
with fewer <strong>and</strong> much heavier bombs).
Aden Comm<strong>and</strong> commented that “<strong>the</strong> tribesmen in sou<strong>the</strong>rn Arabia have respect for
nothing but force. The threat of quick <strong>and</strong> decisive action by overwhelming forces is <strong>the</strong>
only way of ensuring peace in <strong>the</strong> Protectorates.” 105
The growing willingness to take military action came just as <strong>the</strong> international community
began to show an increasing desire to scrutinise <strong>the</strong> behaviour of <strong>the</strong> colonial power.
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”