Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Insurgency</strong>: Early RAF Doctrine
of <strong>the</strong> enemy, direct support of British troops <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> observation of artillery fire. The
ability of aircraft to enhance <strong>the</strong> morale of local troops is noted, as is <strong>the</strong> ability to enhance
communications between army forces in <strong>the</strong> field <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir headquarters. Here <strong>the</strong> need
for close co-operation is stressed: for instance, “during an operation, air observers must be
fully informed of <strong>the</strong> situation up to <strong>the</strong> moment of <strong>the</strong>ir leaving for a flight,” <strong>and</strong> it is also
suggested that an air force liaison officer should be attached to any advancing column to
provide advice to <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>er on all aspects of air operations. 56
O<strong>the</strong>r aspects of support are also explored, such as <strong>the</strong> ability to provide support or relief
for isolated detachments, including <strong>the</strong> capacity to provide supplies by parachute, as well
as casualty evacuation. The escorting of ground convoys is also seen as an important role,
toge<strong>the</strong>r with that of direct offensive action against forces remote from <strong>the</strong> reach of <strong>the</strong>
ground forces. The chapter finishes with a summary which looks at problems relating to
basing <strong>and</strong> support, <strong>and</strong> concludes that <strong>the</strong> optimal approach is one where all aircraft
should be concentrated at a few central air bases, both to ease <strong>the</strong> logistics burden <strong>and</strong> to
ensure that <strong>the</strong>y can be secured by adequate military garrisons.
Yet <strong>the</strong> greatest difference from <strong>the</strong> previous doctrine in this area without doubt comes in
<strong>the</strong> context within which <strong>the</strong> use of force in general, <strong>and</strong> that of air power in particular, is
situated. Consider for instance <strong>the</strong> following statement:
The basis of law <strong>and</strong> order in an uncivilized country is a sound <strong>and</strong>
strong administration. The strength of an administration in <strong>the</strong> eyes
of a native is judged by its capacity to mete out suitable <strong>and</strong> adequate
punishment without delay when misbehaviour occurs. 57
Taken toge<strong>the</strong>r with previously noted comments regarding <strong>the</strong> need for military action to
be considered as <strong>the</strong> last resort, <strong>and</strong> in particular that <strong>the</strong> action undertaken had to have
due regard for <strong>the</strong> desired end-state, it is clear that a far more sophisticated approach to
<strong>the</strong> problems of “air policing” had been developed in a relatively short period of only five
years. This reflects <strong>the</strong> significant gaining of experience in this area during that period, as
<strong>the</strong> RAF took on first <strong>the</strong> complete responsibility for all military activity in Iraq, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n
provided significant support in <strong>the</strong> North-West Frontier area (now Afghanistan).
AP 1300 was not amended until 1940. Yet <strong>the</strong>re was a significant addendum provided
in 1931 in <strong>the</strong> form of ASM 46. This was actually issued in <strong>the</strong> confidential document
(CD) series, which specifically stated that it was intended to “supplement <strong>the</strong>
general principles outlined in Chapter XIV of <strong>the</strong> “Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force War Manual
Part 1,” <strong>and</strong>, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, that all RAF officers were expected not only to be familiar with
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”